Vinayak: April 2015

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

One or two physical assaults, even if true, cannot make out a case of cruelty u/s 498a!

Delhi Sessions court "....One or two instances of physical assault, even if found to be true, cannot make out a case of cruelty for the purpose of satisfying unlawful demand. The cruelty or torture, as contemplated in Section 498-A IPC denotes to a continuous process...."

Looking at the allegations they are all from 2003 and so on , so this seems to be a 10 ..12 year OLD case!!

*****************************disclaimer**********************************

This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon or High court websites. Some notes are made by Vinayak. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog and if you are reading this on tumblr please post responses as comments at vinayak.wordpress.com . Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.

******************************************************************

CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE

******************************************************************

Criminal Revision No. 122/14

IN THE COURT OF SH. PULASTYA PRAMACHALA

ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE

SHAHDARA DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI

Criminal Revision No. : 122/14

FIR No. : 25/04

Under Section : 498-A/406/34 IPC & 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act

Police Station : Gokal Puri

Unique I.D. No. : 02402R0292662014

In the matter of :-

State …..Revisionist

V E R S U S

1. Ishtqar

S/o. Mohd. Islam,

R/o.F-312, Gali No.10,

Bhagirath Vihar, Delhi.

2. Saira

W/o. Zahir,

R/o.F-312, Gali No.10,

Bhagirath Vihar, Delhi.

3. Israr

S/o. Mohd. Islam,

R/o.E-302, Gali No.10,

Bhagirath Vihar, Delhi.

4. Rahis

S/o. Rafiq,

R/o. Gaon-Shikarpur, PS-Bhorkala,

District-Muzaffar Nagar, U.P. …. Respondents

Date of Institution : 24.09.2014

Date of receiving the case in this court : 25.09.2014

Date of reserving order: 24.03.2015

Date of pronouncement: 07.04.2015

Decision: Revision petition is dismissed

http://evinayak.tumblr.com http://vinayak.wordpress.com http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

Additional Sessions Judge (Shahdara)

Karkardooma Courts, Delhi

Criminal Revision No. 122/14

O R D E R

1. This is a criminal revision petition challenging the order dated 05.08.2014, passed by the trial court, in the case titled as State v. Mohsina etc., bearing FIR No. 25/04, PS Gokal Puri, under Section 498-A/406/34 IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act. Vide the impugned order, the trial court discharged accused/respondents herein namely Ishtqar, Saira, Israr and Rahis for offence under Section 498-A/406/34 IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act.

2. The relationship of the complainant Shabnam with the accused persons is as follows :-

i. Mohsina - Sister-in-law (Jethani)

ii. Farida – Sister-in-law (Jethani)

iii. Ansar – Brother-in-law Devar

iv. Ishtikar – brother-in-law (Jeth)

v. Sayra – Sister-in-law (Nanad)

vi. Rehana – Sister-in-law (Devrani)

vii. Rahis – Brother-in-law (Nandoi)

viii.Jahira - Sister-in-law (Nanad)

ix. Mohammad Islam – Father-in-law (Sasur)

x. Mehboob – Husband (since PO)

xi. Israr – Brother-in-law (Jeth) and

xii. Hamiden – Mother-in-law (Saas)

3. Briefly stated, the case set up by prosecution is that accused Mohsina, Farida, Ansar, Ishtikar, Sayra, Rehana, Rahis, Jahira, Mohammad Islam, Mehboob, Israr and Hamiden had subjected complainant Shabnam with cruelty by their willful conduct and by making unlawful demands of dowry in furtherance of their common intention, during subsistence of marriage of complainant.

4. The revisionist/State has challenged the impugned order on the following grounds :-

i. That impugned order is illegal, improper, unjustified and against the established principle of law as settled by hon'ble Apex Court of India and is liable to be modified.

ii. That the trial court has grossly erred in the basic law on the point of framing of charges as laid down by hon'ble Supreme Court of India "that roving enquiry is not required at this stage and further held that charge can be framed even on strong suspicion" and reliance was placed on the judgment pronounced by hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (2010) (9) SCC368. Another case law was cited i.e. State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) (4) SCC 6559, passed by Supreme Court, to submit that "at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage."

iii. The trial court failed to appreciate the complaint/statement of the complainant, wherein accused/respondents herein have been named, which reflects that a prima facie case under Section 498-A/406/34 IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is made out against them and the same has been ignored by ld. MM.

iv. That the serious miscarriage of justice will be occasioned in the present case, if the present revision petition is not allowed. 5. The respondents challenged the revision petition on the grounds that the case was falsely lodged against them. They relied upon the judgment passed by High Court of Delhi in Criminal M.C. No. 7262/2006 decided on 23.02.2007 in the case titled as Smt. Neera Singh v. State, wherein it was observed that "vague allegation as made in the complaint by the petitioner against every member of the family of the husband cannot be accepted by any Court at their face value and the allegations have to be scrutinized carefully by the Court before framing charges." They also referred to the judgment passed by High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Sarita v. R. Ram Chandra (I) (2003) DMC 37. They supported the impugned order, vide which the respondents were discharged by the trial court.

6. I have given due attention to the rival contentions and to the case laws cited before me as well as the materials placed on the trial court record. http://evinayak.tumblr.com http://vinayak.wordpress.com http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

Analysis of evidence:-

7. From the chargesheet filed by IO, I find that the case of prosecution is based only on the complaint made by the complainant namely Ms. Sabnam. In her complaint given to ld. ACP, CAW Seelampur, the complainant made allegations that after her marriage with Sh. Mehboob, she was used to be beaten by her husband at the instance of her in-laws. She further alleged that on 15.05.2002, she was beaten by Sayra, Jahira, Mehboob, Israr and Mohsina due to which she went back to her parental house and after about 5 months she was brought back at her matrimonial house. In the Panchaayat, Israr, Ishtikar, Mehboob, Islam, Jahira and Rahis had promised that she would not be physically assaulted. She further alleged that there was no change in the behaviour of her in-laws and they always used to make demand for money and dowry. She further alleged that her brother-in-laws and sister-in-laws had got the dowry articles broken through their children and themselves. She also alleged about another instance of 28.04.2003 stating that that night her father-in-law, husband, Jahira, Rahis, Ishtikar, Ansar, Hamiden, Sayra, Mohsina and Farida had beaten her and they had thrown her out of the house. She further alleged that her in-laws used to torture her to bring the dowry and they did not allow her to live in the matrimonial house.

FINDINGS:-

8. From the aforesaid allegations made by the complainant, I do find that she had made very vague and general kind of allegations involving name of all family members of her husband, to allege that they used to harass her to bring more dowry. There are apparently no specific allegations against the respondents, which could prima facie show that the respondents used to torture and harass her for the purpose of bringing dowry or to satisfy any other unlawful demand. One or two instances of physical assault, even if found to be true, cannot make out a case of cruelty for the purpose of satisfying unlawful demand. The cruelty or torture, as contemplated in Section 498-A IPC denotes to a continuous process.

9. From the allegations made by the complainant, even I am unable to find any case of continuous torture, if committed by any of the respondents for the purpose of making demand of dowry or any other unlawful demand. It is also to be established that the torture or harassment caused to the complainant was to such an extent so as to drive her to commit suicide or to cause grave injury to the complainant. All such ingredients of Section 498-A IPC are not satisfied by the allegations made by the complainant. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order. Hence, present

10.Trial court record along with copy of this order be sent back to the trial court.

File of revision be consigned to record room, as per rules.

Announced in the open court (PULASTYA PRAMACHALA) today on 07.04.2015 Additional Sessions Judge (Shahdara)

(This order contains 6 pages)

Karkardooma Courts, Delhi

(Pulastya Pramachala)

Additional Sessions Judge (Shahdara)

Karkardooma Courts, Delhi

PDF File uploaded to http://1drv.ms/1aZeTwN

*****************

FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or http://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress or http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases

regards

Vinayak

Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn't given up, Male, activist

One or two instances of assault not cruelty, says court

One or two instances of assault not cruelty, says Delhi Sessions court; In laws acquitted

The News Minute | April 14, 2015 | 09:34 am IST

New Delhi: A court here has said that "one or two instances of physical assault", even if proved, cannot make for a case of cruelty for the purpose of satisfying unlawful demand.

"One or two instances of physical assault, even if found to be true, cannot make out a case of cruelty for the purpose of satisfying unlawful demand," Additional Sessions Judge Pulastya Pramachala said while dismissing a woman's revision plea challenging a magisterial court order that acquitted her in-laws.

The sessions court uphold a magisterial court order, acquitting the woman's brothers-in-law and a sister-in-law of the offences of cruelty by husband or relative of husband of a woman, criminal breach of trust with common intention of the Indian Penal Code and under Dowry Prohibition Act.

The court observed that the cruelty or torture, as contemplated in Section 498-A of the IPC denotes a continuous process.

It noted that there are apparently no specific allegations against the woman's in-laws, which could prima facie show that they used to torture and harass her for the purpose of bringing dowry or to satisfy any other unlawful demand.

"I do find that she had made very vague and general kind of allegations involving name of all family members of her husband to allege that they used to harass her to bring more dowry," the judge said.

"From the allegations made by the complainant, even I am unable to find any case of continuous torture, if committed by any of the respondents for the purpose of making demand of dowry or any other unlawful demand."

According to complainant, her husband used to beat her at the instance of her in-laws. She further alleged that her in-laws used to torture her to bring the dowry and they did not allow her to live in the matrimonial house.

The woman's husband is on run.

The order was delivered last week but released on Monday.

With IANS

*****************

FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or http://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress or http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases

regards

Vinayak

Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn't given up, Male, activist

Monday, April 13, 2015

a 498a hit husband commits suicide & Ablaa 498a wife gets bail

a 498a hit husband commits suicide (Manish Jain committed suicide). His Ablaa 498a wife gets bail (in husband's side counter case ) ...

Salient points

* It is reported that during the Pendancy of THIS bail application, the complainant Manoj Jain committed suicide

* The applicants IN THIS case are the wife of that 498a hit husband !! Husband has filed a counter case, and wife is seeking bail

* FINALLY .... wife gets bail !!!!

Saturday, April 11, 2015

direction NOT to arrest absconding husband IF he cooperates with investigation State vs. Chanpreet Singh Sehmi

* applicant has not joined the investigation and is absconding.

* the applicant be not arrested subject to his not leaving the country and joining the investigation as and when required

*****************************disclaimer**********************************

******************************************************************

CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE

******************************************************************

IN THE COURT OF Ms. ANU MALHOTRA DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE (WEST) : DELHI

Bail App. No. 2301

State vs. Chanpreet Singh Sehmi

FIR No. 816/2014

U/s: 406/498A/34 IPC

PS: Tilak Nagar

01.04.2015

Present:

Ld. Addl. PP Ms. Sushma Badhwar for the State.

Ld. counsel Shri G. P. Thareja for the applicant.

IO / SI Rajpal in person.

Ld. counsel Shri Lalit Kumar for the complainant.

http://evinayak.tumblr.com http://vinayak.wordpress.com http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

In reply to a specific Court query to the IO as to what is the status of investigation after the date 05.03.2015, when the previous application seeking anticipatory bail was rejected by the ld. ASJ (FTC) (West), it is informed by the IO and the counsel for the complainant that the applicant has not joined the investigation and is absconding.

Before proceeding further, the applicant is directed to present himself before the IO on the date 04.04.2015 at 2.00 PM at the PS Tilak Nagar and the IO is directed to submit a report in relation to the investigation conducted for the date 07.04.2015, till which date, the applicant be not arrested subject to his not leaving the country and joining the investigation as and when required and not tampering with the evidence in any manner.

(ANU MALHOTRA)

District & Sessions Judge (West)

Delhi/01.04.2015

PDF http://1drv.ms/1DT2G9x

*****************

FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or http://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress or http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases

regards

Vinayak

Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn't given up, Male, activist

How rape cases are settled every day while the world thinks ALL Indians are rapists !!

IN THE COURT OF Ms. ANU MALHOTRA DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE (WEST) : DELHI

Bail App. No. 1901
State vs. Narender Sawardekar
FIR No. 1619/2014
U/s: 376/420 IPC
PS: Tilak Nagar

01.04.2015

Present:

Ld. Addl. PP Ms. Sushma Badhwar for the State.
Ld. counsel Shri Arvind Vashistha for the applicant.
IO / SI Anju Tyagi in person.

Complainant in person with ld. counsel Shri Saurabh Jain.

On behalf of the complainant and the applicant, at the outset, it is submitted that a settlement has been arrived at between the parties.

An affidavit of the complainant Ms. Manju Singh has been submitted,   submitting   to   the   effect   that   she   does   not   want   to   proceed against the applicant under Section 376/420 of the IPC.

As   per   the   said affidavit, she was also living with the applicant and that the applicant has gone to Russia for work.

The complainant in reply to specific Court queries affirms on oath that she does not want to proceed against the applicant and the statement of the complainant to that effect has been recorded.

The IO has identified the complainant.

On behalf of the State, it is submitted that the State does not oppose the anticipatory bail application of the applicant, in view of the statement made on behalf of the complainant but submits that there are NBWs   already issued against him, qua which, the   applicant may seek redressal in accordance with law before the ld. Trial Court.

In view of the statement made by the complainant and there being   nothing   to   disbelieve   the   same,   the   applicant   is   allowed   to   be released on bail on his filing a bail bond in the sum of Rs. 2,00,000/ with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the IO/SHO concerned, subject to the applicant joining the investigation as and when required and not leaving the country.

(ANU MALHOTRA)

District & Sessions Judge (West)

Delhi/01.04.2015

*****************

FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or http://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress or http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases

regards

Vinayak

Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn't given up, Male, activist

Thursday, April 9, 2015

SAME maintenance EVEN after retirement. Able bodied male can't deny maintenance

Hon. Supreme Court

"...... Sometimes, a plea is advanced by the husband that he does not have the means to pay, for he does not have a job or his business is not doing well. These are only bald excuses and, in fact, they have no acceptability in law. If the husband is healthy, able bodied and is in a position to support himself, he is under the legal obligation to support his wife, for wife's right to receive maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, unless disqualified, is an absolute right.

While determining the quantum of maintenance, this Court in Jabsir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge Dehradun & Ors has held as follows:-

" The court has to consider the status of the parties, their respective needs, the capacity of the husband to pay having regard to his reasonable expenses for his own maintenance and of those he is obliged under the law and statutory but involuntary payments or deductions. The amount of maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as she can live in reasonable comfort considering her status and the mode of life she was used to when she lived with her husband and also that she does not feel handicapped in the prosecution of her case. At the same time, the amount so fixed cannot be excessive or extortionate."...."

************************************************

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.564-565 OF 2015

[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 6380-6381 of 2014]

SHAMIMA FAROOQUI... Appellant

Versus

SHAHID KHAN ... Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

2. When centuries old obstructions are removed, age old shackles are either burnt or lost their force, the chains get rusted, and the human endowments and virtues are not indifferently treated and emphasis is laid on "free identity" and not on "annexed identity", and the women of today can gracefully and boldly assert their legal rights and refuse to be tied down to the obscurant conservatism, and further determined to ostracize the "principle of commodity", and the "barter system" to devoutly engage themselves in learning, criticizing and professing certain principles with committed sensibility and participating in all pertinent and concerned issues, there is no warrant or justification or need to pave the innovative multi-avenues which the law does not countenance or give its stamp of approval. Chivalry, a perverse sense of human egotism, and clutching of feudal megalomaniac ideas or for that matter, any kind of condescending attitude have no room. They are bound to be sent to the ancient woods, and in the new horizon people should proclaim their own ideas and authority. They should be able to say that they are the persons of modern age and they have the ideas of today's "Bharat". Any other idea floated or any song sung in the invocation of male chauvinism is the proposition of an alien, a total stranger – an outsider. That is the truth in essentiality. http://evinayak.tumblr.com http://vinayak.wordpress.com http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

3. The facts which are requisite to be stated for adjudication of these appeals are that the appellant filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) contending, inter alia, that she married Shahid Khan, the respondent herein, on 26.4.1992 and during her stay at the matrimonial home she was prohibited from talking to others, and the husband not only demanded a car from the family but also started harassing her. A time came when he sent her to the parental home where she was compelled to stay for almost three months. The indifferent husband did not come to take her back to the matrimonial home, but she returned with the fond and firm hope that the bond of wedlock would be sustained and cemented with love and peace but as the misfortune would have it, the demand for the vehicle continued and the harassment was used as a weapon for fulfilment of the demand. In due course she came to learn that the husband had illicit relationship with another woman and he wanted to marry her. Usual to sense of human curiosity and wife's right when she asked him she was assaulted. The situation gradually worsened and it became unbearable for her to stay at the matrimonial home. At that juncture, she sought help of her parents who came and took her to the parental home at Lucknow where she availed treatment. Being deserted and ill-treated and, in a way, suffering from fear psychosis she took shelter in the house of her parents and when all her hopes got shattered for reunion, she filed an application for grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs.4000/- per month on the foundation that husband was working on the post of Nayak in the Army and getting a salary of Rs.10,000/- approximately apart from other perks.

4. The application for grant of maintenance was resisted with immense vigour by the husband disputing all the averments pertaining to demand of dowry and harassment and further alleging that he had already given divorce to her on 18.6.1997 and has also paid the Mehar to her.

5. A reply was filed to the same by wife asserting that she had neither the knowledge of divorce nor had she received an amount of Mehar.

6. During the proceeding before the learned Family Judge the wife-appellant examined herself and another, and the respondent-husband examined four witnesses, including himself. The learned Family Judge, Family Court, Lucknow while dealing with the application forming the subject matter Criminal Case No. 1120 of 1998 did not accept the primary objection as regards the maintainability under Section 125 CrPC as the applicant was a Muslim woman and came to hold even after the divorce the application of the wife under Section 125 CrPC was maintainable in the family court. Thereafter, the learned Family Judge appreciating the evidence brought on record came to opine that the marriage between the parties had taken place on 26.4.1992; that the husband had given divorce on 18.6.1997; that she was ill treated at her matrimonial home; and that she had come back to her parental house and staying there; that the husband had not made any provision for grant of maintenance; that the wife did not have any source of income to support her, and the plea advanced by the husband that she had means to sustain her had not been proved; that as the husband was getting at the time of disposal of the application as per the salary certificate Rs.17654/- and accordingly directed that a sum of Rs.2500/- should be paid as monthly maintenance allowance from the date of submission of application till the date of judgment and thereafter Rs.4000/- per month from the date of judgment till the date of remarriage. http://evinayak.tumblr.com http://vinayak.wordpress.com http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

7. The aforesaid order passed by the learned Family Judge came to be assailed before the High Court in Criminal Revision wherein, the High Court after adumbrating the facts referred to the decisions in Anita Rani v. Rakeshpal Singh Dharmendra Kumar Gupta v. Chander Prabha Devi, Rakesh Kumar Dikshit v. Jayanti Devi , Ashutosh Tripathi v. State of U.P. , Paras Nath Kurmi v. The Session Judge and Sartaj v. State of U.P. and others and came to hold that though the learned principal Judge, Family Court had not ascribed any reason for grant of maintenance from the date of application, yet when the case for maintenance was filed in the year 1998 decided on 17.2.2012 and there was no order for interim maintenance, the grant of Rs.2500/- as monthly maintenance from the date of application was neither illegal nor excessive. The High Court took note of the fact that the husband had retired on 1.4.2012 and consequently reduced the maintenance allowance to Rs.2000/-from 1.4.2012 till remarriage of the appellant herein. Being of this view the learned Single Judge modified the order passed by the Family Court. Hence, the present appeal by special leave, at the instance of the wife.

8. We have heard Dr. J.N. Dubey, learned senior counsel for the appellant. Despite service of notice, none has appeared for the respondent.

9. It is submitted by Dr. Dubey, learned senior counsel that Section 125 CrPC is applicable to the Muslim women and the Family Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue. It is urged by him that the High Court has fallen into error by opining that the grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs.4,000/- per month is excessive and hence, it should be reduced to Rs.2000/- per month from the date of retirement of the husband i.e. 1.4.2012 till her re-marriage. It is also contended that the High Court failed to appreciate the plight of the appellant and reduced the amount and hence, the impugned order is not supportable in law.

10. First of all, we intend to deal with the applicability of Section 125 CrPC to a Muslim woman who has been divorced. In Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan, this Court after referring to the Constitution Bench decisions in Danial Latifi v. Union of India and Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P. had opined as follows:

" 13. The aforesaid principle clearly lays down that even after an application has been filed under the provisions of the Act, the Magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman and the parameters and the considerations are the same as stipulated in Section 125 of the Code. We may note that while taking note of the factual score to the effect that the plea of divorce was not accepted by the Magistrate which was upheld by the High Court, the Constitution Bench opined that as the Magistrate could exercise power under Section 125 of the Code for grant of maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman under the Act, the order did not warrant any interference. Thus, the emphasis was laid on the retention of the power by the Magistrate under Section 125 of the Code and the effect of ultimate consequence.

14. Slightly recently, in Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan, a two-Judge Bench, placing reliance on Danial Latifi (supra), has ruled that:-"

21. The appellant's petition under Section 125 CrPC would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as the appellant does not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125 CrPC cannot be restricted for the iddat period only." Though the aforesaid decision was rendered interpreting Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, yet the principle stated therein would be applicable, for the same is in consonance with the principle stated by the Constitution Bench in Khatoon Nisa (supra)."

In view of the aforesaid dictum, there can be no shadow of doubt that Section 125 CrPC has been rightly held to be applicable by the learned Family Judge.

11. On a perusal of the order passed by the Family Court, it is manifest that it has taken note of the fact that the salary of the husband was Rs.17,654/- in May, 2009. It had fixed Rs.2,500/- as monthly maintenance from the date of submission of application till the date of order i.e. 17.2.2012 and from the date of order, at the rate of Rs.4,000/- per month till the date of remarriage. The High Court has opined that while granting maintenance from the date of application, judicial discretion has to be appropriately exercised, for the High Court has noted that the grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs.2,500/- per month from the date of application till date of order, did not call for modification.

12. The aforesaid finding of the High Court, affirming the view of the learned Family Judge is absolutely correct. But what is disturbing is that though the application for grant of maintenance was filed in the year 1998, it was not decided till 17.2.2012. It is also shocking to note that there was no order for grant of interim maintenance. It needs no special emphasis to state that when an application for grant of maintenance is filed by the wife the delay in disposal of the application, to say the least, is an unacceptable situation. It is, in fact, a distressing phenomenon. An application for grant of maintenance has to be disposed of at the earliest. The family courts, which have been established to deal with the matrimonial disputes, which include application under Section 125 CrPC, have become absolutely apathetic to the same. The concern and anguish that was expressed by this Court in Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and Ors., is to the following effect:-

" 13. The Family Courts have been established for adopting and facilitating the conciliation procedure and to deal with family disputes in a speedy and expeditious manner. A three-Judge Bench in K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida, while highlighting on the purpose of bringing in the Family Courts Act by the legislature, opined thus:-"

The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith."

14. The purpose of highlighting this aspect is that in the case at hand the proceeding before the Family Court was conducted without being alive to the objects and reasons of the Act and the spirit of the provisions Under Section 125 of the Code. It is unfortunate that the case continued for nine years before the Family Court. It has come to the notice of the Court that on certain occasions the Family Courts have been granting adjournments in a routine manner as a consequence of which both the parties suffer or, on certain occasions, the wife becomes the worst victim. When such a situation occurs, the purpose of the law gets totally atrophied. http://evinayak.tumblr.com http://vinayak.wordpress.com http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

The Family Judge is expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he is dealing with extremely delicate and sensitive issues pertaining to the marriage and issues ancillary thereto. When we say this, we do not mean that the Family Courts should show undue haste or impatience, but there is a distinction between impatience and to be wisely anxious and conscious about dealing with a situation. A Family Court Judge should remember that the procrastination is the greatest assassin of the lis before it. It not only gives rise to more family problems but also gradually builds unthinkable and Everestine bitterness. It leads to the cold refrigeration of the hidden feelings, if still left. The delineation of the lis by the Family Judge must reveal the awareness and balance. Dilatory tactics by any of the parties has to be sternly dealt with, for the Family Court Judge has to be alive to the fact that the lis before him pertains to emotional fragmentation and delay can feed it to grow. We hope and trust that the Family Court Judges shall remain alert to this and decide the matters as expeditiously as possible keeping in view the objects and reasons of the Act and the scheme of various provisions pertaining to grant of maintenance, divorce, custody of child, property disputes, etc." [emphasis supplied]

13. When the aforesaid anguish was expressed, the predicament was not expected to be removed with any kind of magic. However, the fact remains, these litigations can really corrode the human relationship not only today but will also have the impact for years to come and has the potentiality to take a toll on the society. It occurs either due to the uncontrolled design of the parties or the lethargy and apathy shown by the Judges who man the Family Courts. As far as the first aspect is concerned, it is the duty of the Courts to curtail them. There need not be hurry but procrastination should not be manifest, reflecting the attitude of the Court. As regards the second facet, it is the duty of the Court to have the complete control over the proceeding and not permit the lis to swim the unpredictable grand river of time without knowing when shall it land on the shores or take shelter in a corner tree that stands "still" on some unknown bank of the river. It cannot allow it to sing the song of the brook. "Men may come and men may go, but I go on for ever." This would be the greatest tragedy that can happen to the adjudicating system which is required to deal with most sensitive matters between the man and wife or other family members relating to matrimonial and domestic affairs. There has to be a pro-active approach in this regard and the said approach should be instilled in the Family Court Judges by the Judicial Academies functioning under the High Courts. For the present, we say no more.

14. Coming to the reduction of quantum by the High Court, it is noticed that the High Court has shown immense sympathy to the husband by reducing the amount after his retirement. It has come on record that the husband was getting a monthly salary of Rs.17,654/-. http://evinayak.tumblr.com http://vinayak.wordpress.com http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

15. The High Court, without indicating any reason, has reduced the monthly maintenance allowance to Rs.2,000/-. In today's world, it is extremely difficult to conceive that a woman of her status would be in a position to manage within Rs.2,000/- per month. It can never be forgotten that the inherent and fundamental principle behind Section 125 CrPC is for amelioration of the financial state of affairs as well as mental agony and anguish that woman suffers when she is compelled to leave her matrimonial home. The statute commands there has to be some acceptable arrangements so that she can sustain herself. The principle of sustenance gets more heightened when the children are with her. Be it clarified that sustenance does not mean and can never allow to mean a mere survival. A woman, who is constrained to leave the marital home, should not be allowed to feel that she has fallen from grace and move hither and thither arranging for sustenance. As per law, she is entitled to lead a life in the similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. And that is where the status and strata of the husband comes into play and that is where the legal obligation of the husband becomes a prominent one. As long as the wife is held entitled to grant of maintenance within the parameters of Section 125 CrPC, it has to be adequate so that she can live with dignity as she would have lived in her matrimonial home. She cannot be compelled to become a destitute or a beggar. There can be no shadow of doubt that an order under Section 125 CrPC can be passed if a person despite having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain the wife. Sometimes, a plea is advanced by the husband that he does not have the means to pay, for he does not have a job or his business is not doing well. These are only bald excuses and, in fact, they have no acceptability in law. If the husband is healthy, able bodied and is in a position to support himself, he is under the legal obligation to support his wife, for wife's right to receive maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, unless disqualified, is an absolute right. While determining the quantum of maintenance, this Court in Jabsir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge Dehradun & Ors. has held as follows:-

16. Grant of maintenance to wife has been perceived as a measure of social justice by this Court. In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, it has been ruled that:-

" Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children and as noted by this Court in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal falls within constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental rights and natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and parents when they are unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat."

This being the position in law, it is the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife. He cannot be permitted to plead that he is unable to maintain the wife due to financial constraints as long as he is capable of earning.

17. In this context, we may profitably quote a passage from the judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Chander Prakash Bodhraj v. Shila Rani Chander Prakash wherein it has been opined thus:-

" An able-bodied young man has to be presumed to be capable of earning sufficient money so as to be able reasonably to maintain his wife and child and he cannot be heard to say that he is not in a position to earn enough to be able to maintain them according to the family standard. It is for such able-bodies person to show to the Court cogent grounds for holding that he is unable to reasons beyond his control, to earn enough to discharge his legal obligation of maintaining his wife and child. When the husband does not disclose to the Court the exact amount of his income, the presumption will be easily permissible against him."

18. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is limpid that the obligation of the husband is on a higher pedestal when the question of maintenance of wife and children arises. When the woman leaves the matrimonial home, the situation is quite different. She is deprived of many a comfort. Sometimes the faith in life reduces. Sometimes, she feels she has lost the tenderest friend. There may be a feeling that her fearless courage has brought her the misfortune. At this stage, the only comfort that the law can impose is that the husband is bound to give monetary comfort. That is the only soothing legal balm, for she cannot be allowed to resign to destiny. Therefore, the lawful imposition for grant of maintenance allowance. http://evinayak.tumblr.com http://vinayak.wordpress.com http://fromvinayak.blogspot.com

19. In the instant case, as is seen, the High Court has reduced the amount of maintenance from Rs.4,000/- to Rs.2,000/-. As is manifest, the High Court has become oblivious of the fact that she has to stay on her own. Needless to say, the order of the learned Family Judge is not manifestly perverse. There is nothing perceptible which would show that order is a sanctuary of errors. In fact, when the order is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record, no revisional court should have interfered with the reason on the base that it would have arrived at a different or another conclusion. When substantial justice has been done, there was no reason to interfere. There may be a shelter over her head in the parental house, but other real expenses cannot be ignored. Solely because the husband had retired, there was no justification to reduce the maintenance by 50%. It is not a huge fortune that was showered on the wife that it deserved reduction. It only reflects the non-application of mind and, therefore, we are unable to sustain the said order.

20. Having stated the principle, we would have proceeded to record our consequential conclusion. But, a significant one, we cannot be oblivious of the asseverations made by the appellant. It has been asserted that the respondent had taken voluntary retirement after the judgment dated 17.2.2012 with the purpose of escaping the liability to pay the maintenance amount as directed to the petitioner; that the last drawn salary of respondent taken into account by the learned Family Judge was Rs.17,564/- as per salary slip of May, 2009 and after deduction of AFPP Fund and AGI, the salary of the respondent was Rs.12,564/- and hence, even on the basis of the last basic pay (i.e. Rs.9,830/-) of the respondent the total pension would come to Rs.14,611/- and if 40% of commutation is taken into account then the pension of the respondent amounts to Rs.11,535/-; and that the respondent, in addition to his pension, hand received encashment of commutation to the extent of 40% i.e. Rs.3,84,500/- and other retiral dues i.e. AFPP, AFGI, Gratuity and leave encashment to the tune of Rs.16,01,455/-.

21. The aforesaid aspects have gone uncontroverted as the respondent-husband has not appeared and contested the matter. Therefore, we are disposed to accept the assertions. This exposition of facts further impels us to set aside the order of the High Court.

22. Consequently, the appeals are allowed, the orders passed by the High Court are set aside and that of the Family Court is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.

........................................J. [DIPAK MISRA]

........................................J. [PRAFULLA C. PANT]

NEW DELHI

APRIL 06, 2015.

PDF File uploaded to http://1drv.ms/1PpllMZ

*****************************disclaimer**********************************

******************************************************************

CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE

*****************

FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or http://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress or http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases

regards

Vinayak

Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn't given up, Male, activist

mother in law can file DV case on daughter in law ; Delhi HC

".... A mother who is being maltreated and harassed by her son would be an "aggrieved person". If the said harassment is caused through the female relative of the son i.e. his wife, the said female relative will fall within the ambit of the „respondent?. This phenomenon of the daughters-in-law harassing their mothers-in-law especially who are dependent is not uncommon in the Indian society........"

"...Thus, it is evident that phenomenon which was sought to be addressed was "domestic violence" and not "domestic violence qua the daughter-in-law or the wife only as contemplated under Section 498A......"

********************************************************

Delhi High Court

Kusum Lata Sharma vs State & Anr. on 2 September, 2011

Author: Mukta Gupta

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Crl. M.C. No. 725/2011 & Crl. M.A. No.2797/2011 (Stay)

Reserved on: 19th July, 2011
Decided on: 2nd September, 2011

KUSUM LATA SHARMA                                          ..... Petitioner
Through:                 Mr. Atul Verma, Advocate

versus

STATE & ANR.                                             ..... Respondents
Through:   Mr. Pawan Bahl, APP for the State
Mr. M.S. Jadhav, Adv. for R-2.

Coram:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may        Not Necessary
be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to Reporter or not?               Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported          Yes
in the Digest?

MUKTA GUPTA, J.

1. The Petitioner, one of the Respondents in a Complaint Case No. 40/2011, PS Hauz Khas, New Delhi titled as "Ms. Shakuntala Sharma vs. Nagender Vashishtha & Ors" received summons from the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005(in short the „Act?) to appear on 8th March, 2011. The Petitioner states that the Complainant/Respondent No. 2 is her mother-in- law who is having property dispute with the Petitioner?s husband since 2005 and in order to coerce the Petitioner?s husband to forego his share in the property left behind by Petitioner?s father-in-law, the Respondent no.2 has filed the complaint.

2. It is contended that the object of the Act was for redressal of married women who were subjected to cruelty by their husband or in-laws. The object of the Act clearly states that it does not enable any relative of the husband or the male partner to file a complaint against the wife or the female partner. Thus in a nutshell the contention is that a mother-in-law cannot take recourse to the proceedings under Section 12 of the Act to file a complaint against the daughter-in-law.

3. The learned counsel for the Petitioner relies upon the object of the Act and contends that as per para „2? and „4? of the Statements of Objects & Reasons of the Act, the Act was enacted to address to the phenomena of cruelty inflicted under Section 498A IPC in its entirety. It is further contended that as per Section 2, the Respondent means any adult male person who is or has been in a relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom any relief has been sought under this Act. The proviso to Section 2(q) which provides that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage may also file a complaint against a relative or the husband or the male partner does not include a female relative.

4. The issue whether the „females? are included or not in the definition of „Respondent? in Section 2(q) of the Act came up for consideration before the Hon?ble Supreme Court in Sou. Sandhya Manoj Wankhade vs. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade & Ors., 2011 (3) SCC 650 wherein their Lordships held:-

13. It is true that the expression "female" has not been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or the male partner. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression "relative", nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only.

14. In such circumstances, it is clear that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

15. In our view, both the Sessions Judge and the High Court went wrong in holding otherwise, possibly being influenced by the definition of the expression "Respondent" in the main body of Section 2(q) of the aforesaid Act.

16. The Appeal, therefore, succeeds. The judgments and orders, both of the learned Sessions Judge, Amravati, dated 15 th July, 2009 and the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 5th March, 2010, in Crl. Writ Petition No. 588 of 2009 are set aside.

Consequently, the trial Court shall also proceed against the said Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 on the complaint filed by the Appellant"

5. Division Bench of this Court in "Varsha Kapoor vs. UOI & Ors. 2010 VI AD(Delhi) 472 interpreting Section 2(q) of the Act also came to the same conclusion. Thus the issue whether under Section 2(q) of the Act "the female relative" would be inclusive in the definition is no more res integra. The Division Bench held as under:-

"12. When we interpret the provisions of Section 2 (q) in the context
of the aforesaid scheme, our conclusion would be that the petition is
maintainable even against a woman in the situation contained in
proviso to Section 2(q) of the DV Act. No doubt, the provision is not
very satisfactorily worded and there appears to be some ambiguity in
the definition of „respondent? as contained in Section 2 (q). The
Director of Southern Institute for Social Science Research, Dr. S.S.
Jagnayak in his report has described the ambiguity in Section 2(q) as
"Loopholes to Escape the Respondents from the Cult of this Law" and
opined in the following words:

"As per Section 2 Clause (q) the respondent means any adult male
person who is or has been in a domestic relationship. Hence, a plain
reading of the Act would show that an application will not lie under
the provisions of this Act against a female. But, when Section 19(1)
proviso is perused, it can be seen that the petition is maintainable,
even against a lady. Often this has taken as a contention, when
ladies are arrayed as respondents and it is contended that petition
against female respondents are not maintainable. This is a loophole
which should be plugged."

13. But then, Courts are not supposed to throw their hands up in the air expressing their helplessness. It becomes the duty of the Court to give correct interpretation to such a provision having regard to the purpose sought to be achieved by enacting a particular legislation. This so expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. Anr. Vs. Nilaybhai R. Thakore & Anr. [(1999) 8 SCC 139 in the following words:

"14. Before proceeding to interpret Rule 7 in the manner which we
think is the correct interpretation, we have to bear in mind that it
is not the jurisdiction of the court to enter into the arena of the
legislative prerogative of enacting laws. However, keeping in mind
the fact that the Rule in question is only a subordinate legislation
and by declaring the Rule ultra vires, as has been done by the High
Court, we would be only causing considerable damage to the cause for
which the Municipality had enacted this Rule. We, therefore, think it
appropriate to rely upon the famous and oft-quoted principle relied
by Lord Denning in the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher
[1994] 2 All ER 155 wherein he held : "When a defect appears a judge
cannot simply fold his hand and blame the draftsman. He must set to
work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament
and then he must supplement the written words so as to give 'force
and life' to the intention of the Legislature. A judge should ask
himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves
come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have
straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge
must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and
should iron out the creases". This statement of law made by Lord
Denning has been consistently followed by this Court starting in the
case of M. Pentiah and Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors. :
[1961]2SCR295 and followed as recently as in the case of S. Gopal
Reddy v. Slate of Andhra Pradesh : 1996CriLJ3237 . Thus, following
the above Rule of interpretation and with a view to iron out the
creases in the impugned Rule which offends Article 14, we interpret
Rule 7 as follows : "Local student means a student who has passed
H.S.C./New S.S.C. examination and the qualifying examination from any
of the High Schools or Colleges situated within the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation limits and includes a permanent resident
student of Ahmedabad Municipality who acquires the above
qualifications from any of the High School or College situated within
Ahmedabad Urban Development Area."

14. This Court also followed the aforesaid principles in the case of Star India P. Ltd. Vs. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and Ors. [146 (2008) DLT 445 (DB) in the following words:

"28. It is also a firmly entrenched principle of interpretation of
statutes that the Court is obliged to correct obvious drafting errors
and adopt the constructive role of 'finding the intention of
Parliament... not only from the language of the statute, but also
from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it'
as enunciated in State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd.:
AIR1997SC1511 . The Court should also endeavor to harmoniously
construe a statute so that provisions which appear to be
irreconcilable can be given effect to, rather than strike down one or
the other. It must also not be forgotten that jural presumption is in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute."

15. Having regard to the purpose which the DV Act seeks to achieve and when we read Section 2 (q) along with other provisions, out task is quite simple, which may in first blush appear to be somewhat tricky. We are of the considered view that the manner in which definition of „respondent? is given under Section 2(q) of DV Act, it has to be segregated into two independent and mutually exclusive parts, not treating proviso as adjunct to the main provision. These two parts are:

a) Main enacting part which deals with those aggrieved persons, who are „in a domestic relationship?. Thus, in those cases where aggrieved person is in a domestic relationship with other person against whom she has sought any relief under the DV Act, in that case, such person as respondent has to be an adult male person. Given that aggrieved person has to be a female, such aggrieved person in a domestic relationship can be a mother, a sister, a daughter, sister-in-law, etc.

b) Proviso, on the other hand, deals with limited and specific class of aggrieved person, viz. a wife or a female living in relationship in the nature of marriage. First time by this legislation, the legislator has accepted live in relationship by giving those female who are not formally married, but are living with a male person in a relationship, which is in the nature of marriage, also akin to wife, though not equivalent to wife. This proviso, therefore, caters for wife or a female in a live in relationship. In their case, the definition of „respondent? is widened by not limiting it to „adult male person? only, but also including „a relative of husband or the male partner?, as the case may be.

What follows is that on the one hand, aggrieved persons other than wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage, viz., sister, mother, daughter or sister-in-law as aggrieved person can file application against adult male person only. But on the other hand, wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage is given right to file complaint not only against husband or male partner, but also against his relatives.

16. Having dissected definition into two parts, the rationale for including a female/woman under the expression „relative of the husband or male partner? is not difficult to fathom. It is common knowledge that in case a wife is harassed by husband, other family members may also join husband in treating the wife cruelty and such family members would invariably include female relatives as well. If restricted interpretation is given, as contended by the petitioner, the very purpose for which this Act is enacted would be defeated. It would be very easy for the husband or other male members to frustrate the remedy by ensuring that the violence on the wife is perpetrated by female members. Even when Protection Order under Section 18 or Residence Order under Section 19 is passed, the same can easily be defeated by violating the said orders at the hands of the female relatives of the husband.

19. It is also well-recognized principle of law that while interpreting a provision in statute, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to all provisions. When aforesaid provisions are read conjointly keeping the scheme of the DV Act, it becomes abundantly clear that the legislator intended female relatives also to be respondents in the proceedings initiated by wife or female living in relationship in the nature of marriage."

6. The next issue which arises for consideration is whether the word „aggrieved person? in Section 2(a) of the Act has to be given a restricted meaning in view of the Statement of Objects & Reasons so as to include the daughter-in-law only and excludes only a mother-in-law, sister-in-law or daughter from its ambit. The relevant Sections read as under:-

"2(a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is or has been in a
domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have
been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;

(b).......................

(c).......................

(d)......................

(e)......................

(f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons
who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared
household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or
through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are
family members living together as a joint family;"

7. Thus, a perusal of Section 2(a) and 2(f) of the Act shows that any woman who is in a domestic relationship, the said domestic relationship being one between two persons who lived at any point of time together in a shared household related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or family members living as a joint family and alleges that she has been subjected to any domestic violence by the Respondent is entitled to relief under the Act.

8. The word „aggrieved person? cannot be given a restricted meaning in view of para „2? of the Statement of Objects & Reasons which states that:-

"The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely prevalent but has
remained largely invisible in the public domain. Presently, where a
woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives, it is
an offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The civil law
does not however address this phenomenon in its entirety.

Thus, it is evident that phenomenon which was sought to be addressed was "domestic violence" and not "domestic violence qua the daughter-in-law or the wife only as contemplated under Section 498A.

9. As a matter of fact, para „4(i)? clarifies that even those women who are sisters, widows, mothers, single woman or living with the abuser are entitled to legal protection under the proposed legislation. A mother who is being maltreated and harassed by her son would be an "aggrieved person". If the said harassment is caused through the female relative of the son i.e. his wife, the said female relative will fall within the ambit of the „respondent?. This phenomenon of the daughters-in-law harassing their mothers-in-law especially who are dependent is not uncommon in the Indian society.

10. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon?ble Supreme Court, para „4? of the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be stated to have excluded a female relative of the male partner or a respondent and thus, a mother-in-law being an "aggrieved person" can file a complaint against the daughter-in-law as a respondent.

11. Thus, I find that no case for quashing of the complaint is made out. Petition and application are dismissed.

(MUKTA GUPTA) JUDGE

SEPTEMBER 02, 2011

vkm

*****************

FOLLOW http://twitter.com/ATMwithDick on twitter or http://vinayak.wordpress.com/ on wordpress or http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ FOR 100s of high court and supreme court cases

regards

Vinayak

Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn't given up, Male, activist