Sunday, January 26, 2014

In Kerala husband can be imprisoned one month for each month default in payment of maintenance u.sec 125 CrPC !! meaning he can be imprisoned for years if he is a poor fella !!! or if he looses his job due to imprisonment !!! Kerala HC Gem !! Imprisonment also does NOT mean he will be absolved, relieved of dues; he has to pay when he is out

husband can be imprisoned one month for each month default in payment of maintenance under sec 125 CrPC !! meaning he can be imprisoned for years if he is a poor fella !!! or if he looses his job due to imprisonment !!! Kerala HC Gem !! Imprisonment also does NOT mean he will be absolved, relieved of dues; he has to pay when he is out



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CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE
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Kerala High Court

Revision Petitioners vs State ( By Adv. Sri.Vijai Mathews )

PRESENT:

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANTONY DOMINIC &

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.D.RAJAN

MONDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2013/27TH KARTHIKA, 1935

RPFC.No. 34 of 2010 ( )

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MC.NO.365/2002 OF FAMILY COURT, KOZHIKODE. ......

REVISION PETITIONER(S):

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SANTHOSH, S/O.VELLAN,

C. NO.5976, CENTRAL PRISON,

KANNUR.

BY ADV. SRI.VIJAI MATHEWS (STATE BRIEF).

RESPONDENT(S):

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1. STATE OF KERALA.

2. PUSHPA, D/O.MADHAVAN, ARIYIL MEETHAL HOUSE, ATHOLI AMSOM, KOLAKKAD DESOM, P.O.KOLAKKAD, KOZHIKODE DISTRICT.

3. MANESH (MINOR), (REPRESENTED BY 1ST RESPONDENT MOTHER AS GUARDIAN). BY ADV. SRI.RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN (AMICUS CURIAE).

THIS REV.PETITION(FAMILY COURT) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 18-11-2013, ALONG WITH RPFC. NO. 47 OF 2010 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:


ANTONY DOMINIC & P.D.RAJAN, JJ.
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R.P(FC).Nos.34, 47, 89, 156, 175, 179, 180, 182, 228, 230, 231, 279, 286, 290, 331, 354, 360 & 380 of 2010 and 27, 40, 61, 84, 89, 99, 113, 120, 121, 136 & 142 of 2011
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Dated this the 18th day of November, 2013

O R D E R

Antony Dominic, J.


1.Section 125 of the Cr.PC provides for order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. Sub-section (3) of section 125 provides that if any person ordered to pay maintenance fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, the Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines and may sentence such person, for the whole, or any part of each month's allowance and expenses of proceeding as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made. The first proviso to this sub-section provides that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under section 125 (3), unless application is made to the court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which the amount became due. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

2.The consequences that will visit on a husband who does not pay maintenance to the wife in full or part, despite a warrant issued by a Magistrate calling upon him to pay the dues, came up for consideration before this Court in Sundaran v. Sumathi [2006 (3) KLT 725]. In that case, relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Shahada Khatoon v. Amjad Ali [2000(1) KLT 696 (SC)], it was contended that irrespective of the number of defaults that are committed in paying each month's maintenance, in section 125(3) there is a cap of one month on the total period of imprisonment that can be imposed and that therefore, the sentence of imprisonment ordered by a Magistrate for more than one month is illegal. These contentions were answered by the learned Judge thus:

"5. The counsel argues that the Supreme Court in Shahada's case (supra) has laid down the proposition that whatever be the number of months of default, a defaulter can be sentenced to imprisonment only for one month if such complaint about breach in respect of plurality of months is made in one petition.

6. On the face of it the contention appears to me to be illogical, irrational and unreasonable. The statutory provisions under S.125(3) Cr.P.C make it very clear that one month's imprisonment is the maximum imprisonment for each month's default. If that be so, merely because the destitute lady/child/parent has come to the Court to complain about default in respect of the amount due for more months than one, the defaulter cannot obviously claim immunity or any advantage.

7. The policy of law cannot be to compel such claimants to come to Court with separate petitions for each month's default. That would be a totally unreasonable manner of approaching the question.

I requested the learned counsel for the petitioner to take me through the judgment in Shahada Khatoon in detail to find out whether any such proposition emerges from the decision of the Supreme Court. It is a very short judgment. I extract the entire judgment below:

" The short question that arises for consideration is whether the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court correctly interpreted sub-s.(3) of S.125 of Cr.P.C. by directing that the Magistrate can only sentence for a period of one month or until payment, if sooner made. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that the liability of the husband arising out of an order passed under S.125 to make payment of maintenance is a continuing one and on account of non- payment there has been a breach of the order and therefore the Magistrate would be entitled to impose sentence on such a person continuing him in custody until payment is made. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. The language of sub-s. (3) of S.125 is quite clear and it circumscribes the power of the Magistrate to impose imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until the payment if sooner made. This power of the Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore the only remedy would be after expiry of one month. For breach or non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate the wife can approach the Magistrate again for similar relief. By no stretch of imagination can the Magistrate be permitted to impose sentence for more than one month. In that view of the matter the High Court was fully justified in passing the impugned order and we see no infirmity in the said order to be interfered with by this Court. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed."

(emphasis supplied)

8. I have carefully gone through each sentence in the judgment extracted above. It is impossible to deduce the conclusion which the learned counsel for the petitioner wants this court to accept from any sentence of the judgment or the cumulative effect of all the sentences. The Supreme Court has not held so. It would be unreasonable for this court to hold that the Supreme Court has held so because it goes against the policy of law and the specific stipulations in S.125 (3). I have adverted to this contention in detail, though a reading of the statutory provisions in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court does not leave behind any doubt in my mind, only because it is submitted at the Bar that many Family Courts/Magistrates do choose to follow the interpretation which the petitioner wants to place on the decision in Shahada's case, I need only say that the Supreme Court has not held so. It would be myopic and puerile to hold that the Supreme Court said so. The statutory provisions must lead to the inevitable and unmistakable conclusion that each month's default would be visited with the maximum sentence of one month's imprisonment. The mere fact that the destitute has not chosen to complain every month and has chosen to complain of the breach in respect of plurality of months in one petition within a period of 12 months cannot at all deliver to the defaulter any undeserved advantage. This contention is obviously unacceptable and unsustainable. The Supreme Court was obviously not considering the question whether more than one months imprisonment can be awarded for breach of the direction to pay maintenance committed in respect of more months than one. Though the tactual matrix is not adverted to in detail in the judgment extracted above it is evident that the Supreme Court was considering the question whether more than one month's imprisonment can be imposed on the defaulter if the breach to pay maintenance for one month continues for more months than one. If the default to pay maintenance for a particular month continues for any length of time, maximum imprisonment of one month alone can be imposed. That is all what the Supreme Court has held. The Supreme Court was considering the contention by the counsel that in the event of breach, the defaulter can be detained in custody till the payment is made. That is evident from the judgment (see the portion underlined which refers to the contention). That contention was repelled holding that endless detention until payment was effected cannot be made. There is no reported decision of this court or any other court on the interpretation of Shahada Khatoon except that of the Allahabad High Court. I respectfully disagree with the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court who understood Shahada Khatoon differently in Dhilip Kumar v. Family Court (2000) Crl.L.J. 3893) without reference to the earlier decisions of that Court in Emperor v. Beni (AIR 1938 Allahabad 386) (F.B.) and Ram Bilas v. Bhagwati Devi (1991 Crl.L.J. 1098).

9. To sum up -

(a) If there is no payment of maintenance due for ' n' number of months the defaulter in one Execution Petition can be sentenced to imprisonment upto a maximum of 'n' months, provided 'n' does not exceed

(b) If there is breach of payment of maintenance due for one particular month - notwithstanding the fact that such payment was not made for 'n' months from the date on which it became due, the defaulter can be sentenced only to maximum imprisonment for one month and not 'n' months. Even when the breach in respect of one particular month continues for any length of time, the maximum sentence for breach of the liability to pay one month's maintenance continues to be one month only."

3. In so far as these cases are concerned, these are filed by persons who admittedly have committed default in paying the maintenance. The petitioner in RP(FC).34/10 committed default in paying monthly allowance for a period of 12 months and the Family Court, Kozhikode sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. Similarly, the petitioner in RP(FC).231/10 committed default in paying maintenance payable for 67 months and the Family Court, Malappuram sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for a period of 20 months. In so far as the petitioner in RP(FC). 89/10 is concerned, he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of 17 months. Similar is the case with the other petitioners as well.

4.When these cases came up for consideration before a learned single Judge of this Court, relying on the provisions of section 125(3) Cr.PC, it was contended that if the said provision is understood in the light of the Apex Court judgment in Shahada Khatoon (supra), irrespective of the number of defaults, the Magistrate does not have the power to order imprisonment for more than one month, provided a claim is made in one execution petition. The learned Judge accordingly considered the matter and prima facie found that the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Shahada Khatoon (supra) supports the contention raised and also found support to that view in the judgments of the Allahabad High Court and the Andra Pradesh High Court in Dhilip Kumar v. Family Court [(2000) Crl.L.J. 3893] and Abdul Gafaoor v. Hameema Khatoon [(2004) Crl. L.J. 1280] respectively. On that basis, doubting the correctness of this Court's judgment in Sundaran (supra) and to resolve the conflicting views, these matters were referred by the learned single Judge by his order dated 6.8.2010. It is accordingly that the matters came to be listed before us.

5.We heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, who appeared on State Brief and Sri.Raja Vijayaraghavan who was appointed as the Amicus Curiae.

6.Counsel for both sides took us through the provisions of the Act, various judgments of the Apex Court, this Court and the different High Courts dealing with all aspects of the issue and we have considered the submissions made.

7.Section 125(3) and its provisos read as follows:

"125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.--

(1) xxxxx xxxxxx

(2) xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx

(3)If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole, or any part of each month's allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made:

Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due:

Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing.

Explanation.--If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him."

8.The first part of section 125(3) shows that if a person fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order directing payment of maintenance, for every breach of the order, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines. The second part of the sub-section provides that if after the circulation of the warrant, the attempt for recovery of the amount due fails, the Magistrate may sentence the defaulter to imprisonment for whole or any part of each month's allowance and expenses remaining unpaid, to imprisonment. Third part of this provision states that such imprisonment shall be for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made. The first proviso to this sub-section shows that the Legislature has empowered the Magistrate to issue warrant to recover the amount due only if the application for levying the amount due, as contemplated in sub-section (3), is filed within a period of one year from the date on which the amount became due.

9. A conjoint reading of these provisions of sub-section (3) shows that for every breach of the order, the Magistrate is empowered to issue a warrant provided application is made within one year from the date on which the amount became due and if the amount is remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, the Magistrate is empowered to sentence the defaulter to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made, for the whole or any part of the amount that is remaining unpaid. In sum and substance, the provision empowers the Magistrate to issue warrant for every breach of the order and sentence a person to imprisonment which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made for such breach. In other words, despite execution of the warrant issued on the application that is to be filed within 12 months of the amount becoming due, if amount is not paid, law contemplates a breach for the non-payment of each month's allowance and for such breach, the defaulter is liable to be imprisoned. However, though one month is the maximum period of such imprisonment for each breach, the Magistrate has the discretionary power in fixing the period of imprisonment. This is what the law prescribes and the view that has been taken by the learned Judge in the judgment in Sundaran (supra) is not different.

10.In our view, a contrary view is not warranted from the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Shahada Khatoon (supra). That was a case where the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner was that the liability of the husband arising out of the order passed under section 125 Cr.PC to make payment of maintenance is a continuing one and on account of the non-payment, the breach of the order is a continuing one and therefore, the Magistrate would be entitled to sentence such a person continuing him in custody until payment is made. In other words, what was contended was that section 125(3) authorises the Magistrate to order imprisonment of a defaulter so long as the breach continues.

Such a contention, in our view, is untenable in the face of the period of one month specified in sub-section (3) of section 125 for every breach and it was therefore that the Apex Court concluded that by no stretch of imagination can the Magistrate be permitted to impose sentence for more than one month. This judgment only answers the contention raised and the judgment does not lay down any principle which is of relevance in a case where, in an application filed, default was committed for more than one month. Therefore, to our understanding, the judgment in Shahada Khatoon (supra) cannot be relied on to contend that Sundaran (supra) case was wrongly decided. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

11.The view taken by us also finds support from several other judgments that were cited before us. King Emperor v. Budhoo Mandal Gond [1949 Crl.L.J.673] was a case where for the default in payment of maintenance allowance for four months, the defaulter was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for four months. The provision that was relevant at that time was section 488(3) of Cr.PC, 1882 and the Bombay High Court held thus:

"1. The non applicant Budhoo was sentenced to undergo four months rigorous imprisonment under Section 488(3). Criminal P.C., by the First Class Magistrate, Bilaspur, for his failure to pay Rs.40, maintenance allowance to his wife at the rate of Rs. 10 per mensem; and the Sessions Judge, Raipur, has now reported the case under Section 488, Criminal P.C, to have that sentence reduced to one month, the maximum prescribed by Section 488(3), ibid.

2. The reference cannot be accepted and it appears to me that it was founded on a mistaken view of the effect of S.488(3), Criminal P.C. It is true that in Queen Empress v. Narain 9 ALL.240: (1887 A.W.N.54), it was held that the maximum term of imprisonment under the sub section in question was one month, and that only one month's imprisonment could be awarded n the whole in default of payment of the aggregate of the amounts due. That view was, however dissented from in Allapichai Bavuthar v. Mohidin Bibi 20 Mad. 3:(2 Weir 638), in which a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the maximum imprisonment where one warrant only was issued was one month for each month's arrears of maintenance and if there was a balance for a portion of a month a further term of a month's imprisonment might be imposed for such arrears. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Beni I.L.R (1938) ALL.750: (AIR (25) 1938 ALL.386:39 Cr.L.J. 720(F.B.)) overruled the earlier Allahabad case and followed the decision in the Madras case as well as in Bhiku Khan v. Zahuran, 25 Cal.291, Emperor v. Sardar Muhammad, A.I.R. (22) 1935 Lah. 758: (37 Cr.LJ. 207) and Emperor v. Budhu Ram 50 I.C.847: (A.I.R.(6) 1919 Lah. 197: 20 Cr.L.J.367). A Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court followed the view taken in Allapichai Ravuthar v. Mohidin Bibi, 20 Mad.3: (2 Weir 638), Bhiku Khan v. Zahuran, 25 Cal.291 and Emperor v. Beni I.L.R. (1938) ALL.750: (A.I.R.(25) 1938 ALL.386: 39 Cr.L.J.720(F.B.)) and I am in respectful agreement with that view.

3. Section 316, Criminal P.C. of 1861 was as follows:

"The Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, by warrant direct the amount due to be levied in the manner provided for levying fines or may order such person to be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one month."

The relevant part of Section 488(3), Criminal P.C. of 1882, is:

"Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in manner hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month."

Section 488 of the present Criminal Procedure Code is in the same terms as Section 488, Criminal P.C. Of 1882.

4. The change in the wording is significant and the introduction of the words "for the whole or any part of each month's allowance" is, as the learned Judges pointed our in Emperor v. Beni, ILR (1938) All. 750; (AIR (25) 1938 All.386; 39 Crl.L.J.720 (FB)), vital and they would be unmeaning if it were held that Magistrates can impose a term of imprisonment for only one month under section 488 Cr.PC.

5. The reference is accordingly rejected."

12.The issue came up for consideration again before the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Karson Ramji Chawda v. The State of Bombay [AIR 1958 Bom 99], where, a defaulter in paying four month's maintenance allowance was directed to undergo imprisonment for 15 days for each default. The contention raised in that case was that in passing a sentence for two months, the Magistrate exceeded the jurisdiction conferred on him under section 488(3) of the Cr.PC. This contention was repelled by the Bombay High Court holding thus:

"Therefore, this sub-section confers upon the Magistrate two independent powers: one to issue a warrant which has to be executed in the manner laid down in the sub-section and the other to sentence the person also in the manner laid down in the sub-section. The fallacy underlying Mr.Kotwal's argument is that the sentence follows upon the issue of a warrant. That is not the section. The power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant is not dependent upon the issue of the warrant, or in other words the issue of the warrant is not a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant. Therefore, if we read the provision with regard to the power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant independently of the power to issue the warrant, it is clear that the power to sentence is for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made. Now these words clearly lay down the power of the Magistrate. The power of the Magistrate is in respect of whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid to sentence the applicant for a term not exceeding one month.

Now, the view taken in this unreported judgment was based, with respect, on the assumption with which we have just dealt that a separate warrant should issue for each separate monthly default and when that is done, the maximum punishment can be one month's imprisonment. This view proceeds on the basis that whenever there is a default, a warrant has to be issued and the Magistrate must proceed to sentence the applicant after the warrant has been issued. With respect, there is no warrant for this view and this decision was based on a judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Queen-Empress v. Narain ILR 9 All 240 (B). The Allahabad High Court since then in a Full Bench has come to a contrary conclusion: see Emperor v. Beni. Mr.Chandrachud has also drawn our attention to the judgments in Allapichai Ravuthar v. Mohidin Bibi, ILR 20 Mad 3 (D), and in King Emperor v. Budhoo Mandal, which have also taken the same view and, according to the Allahabad High Court, presumably the decision in Bhiku Khan v. Zahu-ran, ILR 25 Cal 291 (F), is also to the same effect. It may also be pointed out that the history of this section also supports the view that we have taken. In the Code of 1861, the section ran in the following terms:

"The Magistrate may, for every breach of the order by warrant, direct the amount due to be levied in the manner provided for levying fines; or may order such erson to be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one month."

When the Code was amended in 1882, the words substituted were the same as in the Code of 1893.

3. In our opinion, therefore, the learned Magistrate was right in the order that he passed. The result is the application fails and must be dismissed. The applicant to surrender to his bail."

13.Mohammed kutty v. State of Kerala [1984 KLT 835] was a case where, for default in paying the monthly allowance due for the period from 24.6.1981 to 28.3.1983, the defaulter was ordered to undergo imprisonment for a period of 21 months. Repelling an identical contention and following the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Karson Ramji Chawda (supra), this Court held thus:

"5. The next question relates to the quantum of punishment that can be imposed for recovery of arrears of maintenance. Under S.125(3), the sentence, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid, after the execution of the warrant, can only be imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made. Does this provision mean that the maximum sentence which the Magistrate can impose is only one month? The power to sentence is in respect of the whole or any part, of each month's allowance defaulted and therefore for the default in respect of each month, there can be a sentence of imprisonment upto one month. It is not correct to assume that the power of Magistrate is to impose only a month's imprisonment irrespective of the duration of the arrears of maintenance. A month's imprisonment for every month's default is the maximum penalty under S.125 (3) and not a maximum of a month's imprisonment for the total default.

6. This is the view expressed in a Full Bench ruling of the Bombay High Court in K.R. Chawda v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1958 Bombay 99) where Chagla C J. speaking on behalf of Gajendragadkar and Vyas JJ. observed thus:

"The power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant is not dependent upon the issue of the warrant, or in other words the issue of the warrant is not a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant. Therefore, if we read the provision with regard to the power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant independently of the power to issue the warrant, it is clear that the power to sentence is for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if ooner made. Now these words clearly lay down the power of the Magistrate. The power of the Magistrate is in respect of whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid to sentence the applicant for a term not exceeding one month."

7. This has been followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gangula Pratao Reddy v. Gangula Vijayalakshmi (1 (1983) Divorce and Matrimonial Cases 181).

8. I am in respectful agreement with the views so expressed.

9. However, the court has to exercise its discretion in each case and decide whether the maximum penalty should be imposed or whether a lesser punishment is sufficient. A month's imprisonment for every default is not the rule and sentencing cannot be mechanical. The court has to apply its mind, consider the circumstances of each case and then decide about the quantum of punishment, having due regard to the statutory limit of the maximum punishment of one month for each default. In this case, the court wrongly thought that the maximum punishment should automatically follow forgetting that the court has a discretion in the matter."

14.A similar issue was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sunil Kumar v. Jalaja [2007(1) KLT 877], where also, relying on Shahada Khatoon (supra), it was contended that for realisation of the amount due, imprisonment for one month alone was permissible and that imprisonment beyond that was impermissible. Rejecting that contention and also relying on Mohammed kutty (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held thus:

"6. The Supreme Court has thus specifically mentioned in that decision that "for breach of non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate, the wife can approach the Magistrate again for similar relief". That means merely because of undergoing imprisonment for one month provided for sub-s.(3) of S.125, it cannot be stated that a breach will never occur. Therefore, the decision relied on by the petitioner does not support the case of the petitioner fully. This Court in Mohammed Kutty v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT 835) held that "a month's imprisonment for every month's default is the maximum penalty under S.125(3), and not a maximum of a month's imprisonment for the total default. In the light of this pronouncement, the contention of the petitioner cannot be said to be sustainable."

15.We are also fully fortified in our view by the judgment of a Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Suo Motu v. State of Gujarat [2009 Crl.L.J.920(F.B.)] where an identical contention was rejected holding thus:

"14. Sub-section (1) of section 125 thus provides for monthly allowance to be paid to the wife, children, mother or father, as the case may be, at such monthly rate as the Magistrate thinks fit. It can thus be seen that the maintenance that the Magistrate awards under section 125(1) becomes payable every month.


Sub-section (3) of section 125 provides for summary procedure for recovery of such maintenance allowance so fixed by the Magistrate, if any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order. It is provided that in such a case, for every breach of the order, the Magistrate may issue warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines and may sentence such person for the whole or any part of each month's allowance for the maintenance including interim maintenance remaining unpaid to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made. Sub- section (3) of section 125 thus empowers the Magistrate to award sentence upto one month for the whole or part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid. Limitation on the power of the Magistrate to impose imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, therefore, has to be viewed in the background of the purpose for which such imprisonment is provided. As already noticed, section 125(1) refers to onthly allowance to be fixed by the Magistrate for maintenance of wife, child, father or mother on such monthly rate as the Magistrate thinks fit. Upon failure of a person to comply with such an order, it is open for the Magistrate for every breach of the order to issue warrant for levying the amount due and further to sentence such a person for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month. To our mind, therefore, the Legislature never intended that regardless of the extent of the default on the part of the husband, the Magistrate can impose sentence only upto one month. True interpretation of section 125(3), in our view, would be that for each month of default in payment of maintenance, it is open for the Magistrate to sentence the defaulting person to imprisonment for a period of one month or until payment if sooner made. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

15. The question can be looked from a slightly different angle. If for each month of default of payment of maintenance, the wife were to file separate applications before the Magistrate, surely, it would be open for the Magistrate to pass separate orders of sentences each not exceeding one month. If that be so, would it not be open for the wife to file one consolidated application for every month's default instead of filing separate application for each month of arrears and in such a situation, would it not be open for the Magistrate to pass one consolidated order of sentence upto a maximum one month for each month of default in payment of maintenance? The answer obviously is in the affirmative as long as the application is made by the wife within one year from the date on which the amount has become due as provided under sub-section (3) of section 125. To our mind, the Apex Court in the case of Shahada Khatoon did not lay down that for every month's default, it is not open for the Magistrate to sentence the defaulting husband for more than one month. It is well settled that the decisions of the Apex Court are not to be interpreted like statutes. In the case of P.S.Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 5152, it was held that judgment of the Supreme Court must be read as a whole and the ratio there from is required to be culled out from reading the same in its entirety and not only a part of it.

16. One may notice that the provision of section 125(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code insofar as the same is relevant for our purpose is similar to sub- section (3) of section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1882 which reads as follows:

"The Magistrate may, for every breach of the order issue a warrant for levying the amount due in manner hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month."

Criminal Procedure Code 1882 replaced the old Criminal Procedure Code 1861. Similar provisions were made in ection 316 of the Code of 1861. However, there were certain significant differences - Section 316 of the Code of 1861 reads as follows:

"The Magistrate may, for every breach of the order by warrant, direct the amount due to be levied in the manner provided for levying fines; or may order such person to be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one month."

Comparing the two provisions, it can be seen that in section 488 of the Code of 1882, the Legislature added the words: "may sentence such person for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid". Addition of words "of each month's allowance" are significant. Earlier provisions of section 316 of the Code of 1861 could have been interpreted as providing for the limitation on the power of the Magistrate to impose sentence for a term not exceeding one month regardless of the extent of the default. However, the Legislature made the position clear in the later enactment by adding words "each month's allowance". Modification in the provision was thus to remove a possible confusion. While understanding the existing provisions of section 125(3) which are in pari materia to section 488(3) of the Code of 1882, this important aspect has to be borne in mind. It may be noted that in the Criminal procedure Code of 1898, these provisions were retaining in same terms as in the Code of 1882.

x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x


22. In the result, question is answered in following terms:

"Magistrate in exercise of powers under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code is empowered to sentence a defaulting person for a term upto one month (or until payment if sooner made) for each month of default subject of course to the limitation provided in proviso to sub-section (3) of section 125. In other words, it is open for the Magistrate to award sentence upto a maximum of one month for each month of default committed by the person ordered to pay maintenance and the maximum limit of sentence of one month referred to in sub-section (3) of section 125 will be applicable for each month of default. Magistrate can entertain separate applications from the person entitled to receive such maintenance or even entertain a common application for several months of default and pass appropriate order and, if found necessary, sentence a defaulting person upto a maximum one month for each month of default. In all such cases, however, period of limitation provided in sub-section (3) of section 125 shall have to be borne in mind".

16.Counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Dilip Kumar v. Family Court, Gorakhpur [2000 Crl. L.J. 3893] where it was held that for default in paying the maintenance, court cannot keep a person in confinement for any period beyond one month and the reasoning of the learned Judge is reflected in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment which reads thus:

"4. From these it is clearly available that the person can be kept under confinement for each months default and the confinement can be only for a period of one month. The subsequent part "until payment if sooner made" further clarifies the situation to the extent that such a husband can be confined to a period of one month even if the default is of more than a month and he can be allowed to come out of jail if the payment is made earlier at any point of time within this period. This very clearly indicates that if the payment is made within this period on any date his confinement will come to an end. The purpose behind this enactment of provision for confinement is to put an end to the sufferings of the wife by compelling the husband to pay the maintenance amount. The Court cannot keep him in confinement any further beyond a period of one month by one stroke of pen in the present case an application was moved by the wife for the recovery of the arrear amount which appears to be for several months.

The Family Judge has passed a consolidated order for 12 months confinement of the applicant, i.e. for the total period of default. The applicant is the husband, who has failed to make payment of the maintenance amount allowed not only to the wife but also to his children. He has failed to discharge this obligation.

The Court is vested with his extensive power with his interest in mind, i.e. compelling the husband to discharge his obligation imposed upon him by an order of a competent Court.
 http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

5. In view of the discussions made above, the order of the learned Family Judge is wholly unsustainable. I am fortified in my view by a latest decision of the Apex Court reported in (1999) 5 SCC 672:(1999 AIR SCW 4880) (Shahada Khatoon v. Amjad Ali). The Apex Court has gone to the extent of saying that the confinement can extend to only one month and if even after the expiry of one month the delinquent husband does not make the payment of arrears then the wife can approach the Magistrate again for a similar relief but the confinement of the husband must be only of one month. In the own words of the Apex Court "By no stretch of imagination can the Magistrate be permitted to impose sentence for more than one month". Thus, this latest decision of the Apex Court further lays down a fetter in the exercise of this power by the Judicial Magistrate or the Family Judge to the extent that only a confinement for a period of one month can be passed on an application whether the amount claimed by the wife as arrears is for more than one month or for only a month. In one stroke no composite confinement can be directed by the Court. It very clearly flows from the above decision. This power can be exercised only after a warrant for recovery of the unpaid maintenance allowance is issued by the Court. This warrant is to be executed like any warrant of recovery of fine. This fine can be recovered like any land revenue arrears. Unless that exercise is first adhered to, this power of confinement to jail for his failure cannot be resorted to by any Court."

17. Same view has been taken by a Division Bench of the Andra Pradesh High Court in Abdul Gafaoor v. Hameema Khatoon [(2004) Crl. L.J. 1280] where, referring to Shahada Khatoon (supra), it was held in paragraph 3 as follows:

"3.From bare perusal of this provision, it becomes clear that a person against whom an order under Section 125(3) of the Code is made does not become liable to imprisonment on passing of an order of maintenance, his liability to suffer imprisonment only starts if he fails to respond to a warrant issued under Section 125(3) of the Code for payment of maintenance. A warrant has to be issued under Section 125(3) of the Code for payment of maintenance, when an application is made by the person who has been held entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. When such a warrant is issued for making payment of maintenance, it has to be levied as the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines and if this warrant is not responded by making the payment, then the Magistrate can order imprisonment and the imprisonment in no case can exceed one month. Therefore, it is immaterial whether there were arrears of 12 months or of any other duration. The material question is whether a warrant under Section 125(3) been issued or not and in case of one warrant issued under Section 125(3) of the Code, there can only be one imprisonment and the maximum imprisonment would be one month. So in case a person chooses to file an application under Section 125(3) of the Code on every successive month on failure to get maintenance, she may get successive orders of imprisonment if the person against whom the warrant is issued fails to make the payment. But if a person chooses to make an application after several months, then again she will be able to get an order of imprisonment on failure to make the payment which will be only a maximum imprisonment of one month. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "

18.We have already held that the principles laid down in Shahada Khatoon (supra) does not lay down any principle irrespective of the number of breaches committed, the Magistrate Cannot sentence the defaulter for imprisonment for any period beyond one month. Secondly, the reasoning adopted by the Allahabad and the Andra Pradesh High Courts ignores the wording of section 125(3), which explicitly provides for imprisonment for every breach of the order which occurs when default in the payment of monthly allowance is committed every month. Therefore, we are unable to endorse the view taken by the Allahabad and Andra Pradesh High Courts. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

19.It was argued before us that the purpose of section 125 is to provide maintenance to the destitute wives, children and parents and that the said purpose would be defeated if the defaulting husbands are allowed to languish in jails and thereby prevented from earning money and pay the maintenance due. In other words, what was contended was that imprisonment once undergone is a sufficient cause to avoid further imprisonment for subsequent breaches. We do concede to the argument that the object of section 125 is to safeguard the interests of destitute wives, children and parents. We also accept that the provision should be liberally construed to the benefit of the section of the society which is intended to be benefited by the provision. This argument is not warranted by the language of the statute and such a view will only defeat the object of the provision. Therefore, we are unable to agree that imprisonment undergone by a defaulter would entitle him to avoid the consequence of further breach or that the imprisonment of a defaulter would deprive him the opportunity to earn money and pay the maintenance due and therefore, the imprisonment should be caped at one month period. The only justification that is recognised by the legislature in Section 125(3) to avoid imprisonment is "sufficient cause". Therefore, what was to be seen is whether imprisonment undergone is a "sufficient cause" to avoid further imprisonment. In fact, the Apex Court considered the question whether, by undergoing imprisonment, the liability is wiped off and has negatived this contention in its judgment in Kuldip Kaur v. Surinder Singh [AIR 1989 SC 232] where, in paragraph 6, it has been held thus:

6.A distinction has to be drawn between a mode of enforcing recovery on the one hand and effecting actual recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears on the other. Sentencing a person to jail is a 'mode of enforcement'. It is not a 'mode of satisfaction' of the liability. The liability can be satisfied only by making actual payment of the arrears. The whole purpose of sending to jail is to oblige a person liable to pay the monthly allowance who refuses to comply with the order without sufficient cause, to obey the order and to make the payment. The purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe out the liability which he has refused to discharge. Be it also realised that a person ordered to pay monthly allowance can be sent to jail only if he fails to pay monthly allowance 'without sufficient cause' to comply with the order. It would indeed be strange to hold that a person who 'without reasonable cause' refuses to comply with the order of the Court to maintain his neglected wife or child would be absolved of his liability merely because he prefers to go to jail. A sentence of jail is no substitute for the recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears. Monthly allowance is paid in order to enable the wife and child to live by providing with the essential economic wherewithal. Neither the neglected wife nor the neglected child can live without funds for purchasing food and the essential articles to enable them to live. Instead of providing them with the funds, no useful purpose would be served by sending the husband to jail. Sentencing to jail is the means for achieving the end of enforcing the order by recovering the amount of arrears. It is not a mode of discharging liability. The section does not say so. The Parliament in its wisdom has not said so. Commonsense does not support such a construction. From where does the Court draw inspiration for persuading itself that the liability arising under the order for maintenance would stand discharged upon an effort being made to recover it? The order for monthly allowance can be discharged only upon the monthly allowance being recovered. The liability cannot be taken to have been discharged by sending the person liable to pay the monthly allowance, to jail. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that it is only a mode or method of recovery and not a substitute for recovery. No other view is possible. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "


20.Similarly, in the judgment in Ajithkumar v. Shaima [2009 (3) KLT 452], this Court has held that imprisonment is no substitute for payment. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment reads thus:

7. The existence of "sufficient cause" for non- payment of maintenance alone can save the person ordered to pay maintenance from a sentence of imprisonment, "Sufficient cause" implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word, "sufficient" means "adequate", "enough", "as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended". It embraces something which is sufficient to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances when viewed from reasonable standard of practical and cautious men (See Benarsi Das v. D.D. Cement Ltd. (AIR 1959 Punj. 232). "Sufficient cause" implies no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fides on the part of the person concerned. It involves some cause beyond the control of the party concerned. For a party to invoke aid of Court using the expression "sufficient cause" he must have acted with due care and caution. A party who is guilty of a negligence or inaction cannot successfully plead that he has sufficient cause for such inaction. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

8. Petitioner, it has already been found has sufficient means to pay maintenance to the respondent. He is able bodied and in the absence of proof of cogent reason to hold otherwise it has to be taken that he continues to be capable of earning and thus continues to have the means to pay maintenance. At a time when he was capable of earning and had a job also even according to him, he failed to comply with the order for payment of maintenance without "sufficient cause". He then had no case that his failure to comply with the order was due to "sufficient cause". That resulted in his imprisonment. That imprisonment was due to his own fault in not paying the maintenance. He cannot, in my view take his fault and the consequent imprisonment as a ground to refuse payment of maintenance due for the period during which he was in prison. His imprisonment on account of his own fault is not a "sufficient cause" as understood in sub-s.(3) of S.125 of the Code. He continued to have "sufficient means" notwithstanding his previous imprisonment. The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Durga Singh Lodhi v. Prembai & Ors. (2009 (3) Crimes 90) supports this view. ln that case for non-payment of maintenance the husband was sentenced to imprisonment. He challenged the order on the ground that he had no property. Division Bench considered the question whether a person against whom there is an order under S.125(1) of the Code with no property whatsoever could be sentenced to imprisonment under sub-s.(3) of S.125 of the Code. The Court held that that notwithstanding that husband had no property whatsoever,

".......if, with this visible capacity to earn, he avoids payment, it has to be held that he has so done for no sufficient cause. If such a person avoids to discharge that obligation despite issuance of a distress warrant, he can be sentenced to imprisonment."

The principles laid down in these judgments make it clear that imprisonment undergone is not a sufficient cause to avoid further imprisonment. If that be so, this contention raised by the counsel also does not merit acceptance.

21.For the aforesaid reasons, we approve the principles laid down by this Court in Sundaran v. Sumathi [2006 (3) KLT 725]. The reference is answered accordingly. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

22.We place on record our deep appreciation and gratitude to Sri.Raja Vijayaraghavan, learned Amicus Curiae and other counsel who have assisted us in these cases. The matters will be posted before the appropriate Bench for disposal in accordance with law. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/


Sd/-

ANTONY DOMINIC, Judge.

Sd/-

P.D.RAJAN, Judge.

kkb.



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FW from Lawyers club India : Any help for this hubby ? His abla nari muslim wife , EX-DIVORCEE filed FAKE 498a on SECOND husband as well , meaning one case on first and second case on second husband !!!




>>> FW from Lawyers club India : Any help for this hubby ? His abla nari muslim wife , EX-DIVORCEE filed FAKE 498a on SECOND husband as well , meaning one case on first and second case on second husband !!!>>>



**************************************


being a muslim my second wife married me without taking legal divorce from her previous husband.

498a is under trial with her previous husband by now

after marriage with me she booked me under 498a .it means one 498a on me and one 498a on previous husband  at one
time.

498a on me was resulted in final report by io and accepted by honourable court  .498a on preavious husband is under trial by
now.

i gave her Talak looking her original color in a simple paper with her signature and thumb impression .

and i allow her to reside in my home for coming four months.

after four months i said her to evict my house but she clearly denied to vaccate my house

i filled eviction suit  in civil courtand another case for void and annulment against her in family court in ____Month 1 ____

notice of both two cases was recieved by her on ___2013____ (month 1)

she came in very anger and started Tamasha and nangapan at my work place

on 3rd day of ___(month2) she gave complainant against me and my family in Mahila Police station for false dowry demanding .date 26th ____ (month 2) was fixed for mediation but she did not wait for fixed date 26th _____ (month 2)

on her complainant on dated 10th (month 2) police of another thana booked me and my family N.C.R under section 504,506 ipc with simple injuries.

but on dated 17th (month 2) she got order from court under (155)2 crpc for converting that N.C.R under section 323,498a ,3\4
and 316 ,452 ipc

her Tamasha at my work place is continue by now

on dated 3rd __month__3___she gave me threat on my phone to kill me if i do not transfer my house in her name . i recorded her voice giving threat to kill me .and gave this call recording to police along with complaint

on my complainant on dated 3rd __month__3___ 2014 police booked her in a case of 323,386,504,506 ipc

but due to her political approach police did nothing .male io are afraid with her and denying to investigation

once again she made fool to court

on 8th january she filled another false case against me through (156)3 crpc under section 420,467,468,471,382 ipc  claiming
that " the signature and thumb imppression  on a simple paper of  talak was not her " how ever the signature and thumb
impression are only her not forged by me

argument for (156)3 is fixed on dated ____ (mont 3) 2014 for above mentioned ipc section

my question is

being her original sign and thumb impression on the paper of Talak how should i convince to court that   not to passed any
order against me for false complaint because her sign and thumb impression are original not forged ?

under what section of crpc or evidence act should i move application in the court to match her sign or thumb impression for
showing her false statement ?

being an accused in this case am i entitled to move any application in court to match her sign or thumb impression at the
stage of (156)3 crpc being an inter locutory order ?

if there are citation please please provide

one important  great great digree of this false wife

she herself her father her mother her brother are accused of an another case of 420,467,468,471,120b in 2010 charge sheet
has been filled against all of them and this time they all are on bail from high court allahabad after six months in jail


Link
http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/forum/details.asp?mod_id=84890&offset=10#.UuTu17Rfpki

please scroll down to see post





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Major daughters (i.e.) above 18 not entitled to maintenance u.s 125 Crpc. Husband obtained ex parte RCR against wife, he did NOT execute it so wife IS entitled to maintenance u.s 125 Crpc . The honourable court ENHANCES wfe's maintenance !! even though she did NOT appear for the case

Major daughters (i.e.) above 18 not entitled to maintenance u.s 125 Crpc. Husband obtained ex parte RCR against wife, he did NOT execute it so wife IS entitled to maintenance u.s 125 Crpc . The honourable court ENHANCES wfe's maintenance !! even though she did NOT appear for the case

If minor daughters want to claim maintenance allowance from their father even after attaining majority, then they can approach Civil Court for this purpose !!!


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This judgment and other similar judgments posted on this blog was / were collected from Judis nic in website and / or other websites of Govt. of India or other internet web sites like worldlii or indiankanoon. Some notes are made by Vinayak. This is a free service provided by Vinayak (pen name). Vinayak is a member of SIF - Save Indian Family Foundation. SIF is committed to fighting FALSE dowry cases and elder abuse. SIF supports gender equality and a fair treatment of law abiding Indian men. Should you find the dictum in this judgment or the judgment itself repealed or amended or would like to make improvements or comments, please post a comment on the comment section of the blog or write to e _ vinayak @ yahoo . com (please remove spaces). Vinayak is NOT a lawyer and nothing in this blog and/or site and/or file should be considered as legal advise.
 
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CASE FROM JUDIS / INDIAN KANOON WEB SITE
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Amod Kumar Srivastava vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 23 May, 2008

Amod Kumar Srivastava vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 23/5/2008

JUDGMENT

Vijay Kumar Verma, J.

1. "Whether a unmarried daughter who has attained majority, but unable to maintain herself and a wife, who wilfully disobeys the directions given by the court in the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights, can claim maintenance allowance under the provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (in short 'the Cr.P.C.') are the main questions that fall for consideration in these revisions.

2. Challenge in both these revisions is to the judgement and order dated 24.06.2006 passed by the Family Court Varanasi in Case No. 12 of 2002 Smt. Neelam Srivastava v. Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava, whereby allowing the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C., maintenance allowance @ Rs. 2500/- per month to Smt. Neelam Srivastava and Rs. 2000/- per month to both the daughters namely Km. Bhavya and Km. Divya (opposite parties No. 3 and 4 in Crl. Revision No. 4400 of 2006) has been granted from the date of order. Smt. Neelam Srivastava has prayed in Criminal Revision No. 5598 of 2006 to enhance and grant maintenance allowance from the date of application under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts leading to the filing of these revisions, as emerging from the record, in brief, are that marriage of Sri Amod Kukmar Srivastava and Smt. Neelam Srivastava took place according to the Hindu rites and rituals in the year 1981. Out of the wedlock, the couple was blessed with two daughters namely Km. Bhavya and Km. Divya. Unfortunately their marriage could not succeed. Ultimately, Smt. Neelam Srivastava had to resort to the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. and she filed an application for maintenance against her husband Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava on 12.03.1986 in the court of Munsif Magistrate Varanasi. The case remained pending for a considerable long period and ultimately the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was allowed vide impugned order dated 24.06.2006 passed by the Family Court Varanasi, whereby the maintenance allowance as mentioned in para (2) above has been granted from the date of order. Hence these revisions. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

4. When the revisions were called for hearing on revising the list, none appeared for Smt. Neelam Srivastava and her daughters Km. Bhavya and Km. Divya. Hence arguments of Sri Sameer Jain Advocate, learned Counsel appearing for Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava in both revisions and learned AGA for the State were heard.

5. Two contentions were raised by the learned Counsel for the revisionist Amod Kumar Srivastava. The first contention was that both the daughters namely Km. Bhavya and Km. Divya had attained majority prior to the passing of impugned judgment and hence they are not entitled now to get any maintenance under the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. It was also submitted in this regard that the elder daughter Km. Bhavya has married on 13.05.2007 and on this ground also she is not entitled to get any maintenance from her father. In support of this first contention, the learned Counsel for the revisionist in Crl. Revision No. 4400 of 2006 has placed reliance on the following cases: http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

(1) Moideenkutty v. Pathumma and Ors. 1984 (2) (Kerala) 355.

(2) Kum. L. Usharani and Ors. v. D.S. Lakshmaiah 1993 Cri. L.J. 982 and

(3) T.P.S. Selva Saroja v. T.P.S.H. Sasinathana 1989 Crl. L.J. 2032

6. The second contention of Sri Sameer Jain was that a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights was passed against Smt. Neelam Srivastava on 17.04.1986 in suit No. 54 of 1986 by Civil Judge Jaunpur and since that decree has not been complied with by her and she did not come to live with her husband Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava, hence on this ground, she is disentitled to get any maintenance allowance from her husband. In support of this contention Sri Jain has placed reliance on the following cases:

(1) Harish Mansukhlal v. Hansagauri Ramshanker and Anr. 1982 CRL.L.J. 2033.

(2) In the matter of : Rabindra Nath Roy 1995 CRL.L.J.1187.

(3) Balram Dash v. Smt. Gitanjali Dash and Ors. 2000 Crl. L.J. 4175

7. The learned AGA on the other hand has supported the impugned judgement contending that the learned lower court has not committed any illegality in granting maintenance allowance to the wife and daughters of Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava.

8. Having given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by the parties' counsel, I agree with the first contention only of the learned Counsel for Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava. His first contention that on attaining majority a child (not being a married daughter) is not entitled to get maintenance allowance under the provisions of Section 125 Cr. P.C. unless on account of any physical or mental abnormality or injury, such child is unable to maintain itself, has got force and must be accepted. Before coming to the facts of instant case, it would be useful to reproduce the provisions of claiming maintenance allowance under the old and new Cr.P.C. Section 488 of old Cr.P.C., which was corresponding to Section 125 of new Cr.P.C. reads as under: http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

488(1) If any person having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his legitimate or illegitimate child unable to maintain, itself, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the Ist Class, may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding Rs. 500/- in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate from time to time directs.

Relevant part of Section 125(1) of new Cr.P.C. after amendment in the year 2001 reads as hereunder:

125(1) Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents:- (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain-

(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or

(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or

(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child(not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or

(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may; upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother at such monthly rate as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:

9. Basing on the difference of wordings in Section 488 and 125 of old and new Cr.P.C., Sri Samir Jain submitted that in instant case, both the daughters are not entitled to get maintenance allowance from their father under the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. after attaining majority, because there is nothing on record to show that after attaining majority they are unable to maintain themselves by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury. I entirely agree with this submission. Admittedly both the daughters namely Km. Divya and Km. Bhavya have attained majority. Annexure No. 1 to the accompanying affidavit in criminal revision No. 4400 of 2006 is the copy of the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C., which was filed by Smt. Neelam Srivastava against her husband Amod Kumar Srivastava. According to para 6 of this application, the first daughter of the couple was born on 14.09.1982 and the second daughter was born on 14.06.1984. The impugned order granting maintenance allowance to the daughters and their mother Smt. Neelam Srivastava was passed by the Family Court, Varanasi on 24.06.2006. Much prior to the passing of impugned order, both the daughters had attained majority. Therefore, having regard to the provisions of Section 125 (1) (c) Cr.P.C., both the daughters were not entitled to get any maintenance allowance after attaining majority, because under Section 125 (1) (c) Cr.P.C., the inability to maintain itself must be by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury in the case of child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

10. The matter of granting maintenance allowance under the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. to the unmarried daughter who attained majority came up for consideration before Madras High Court in the case of T.P.S.H. Selva Saroja v. T.P.S. H. Sasinathana 1989 Cri L.J. 2032. After considering the provisions of Section 488 of old Cr.P.C. and Section 125 of new Cr.P.C., it is observed as under in para 10 of the judgement at page 2035:

It is, therefore, seen that the Act makes it clear that any child, who has attained majority, is not automatically entitled to claim maintenance, even if he is unable to maintain himself, as was the case in the old Code but inability to maintain should arise out of physical or mental abnormality or injury. In the past as well as in the present, the limitation is the inability to maintain itself. This inability to maintain in the case of a major must be by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury. A mere physical or mental abnormality or a mere injury, which does not make the child unable to maintain itself will not be covered under Section 125(1) (c) of the Code.

11. This matter was considered by Karnatka High Court also in the case of Kum. L. Usharani and Ors. v. D.S. Lakshmaiah 1993 Cri L.J. 982. In that case also, provisions of Section 488 and 125 of the old and new Cr.P.C. were considered and it was held that "it may be noticed that the Parliament in its wisdom has enabled only a minor child whether legitimate or illegitimate to claim maintenance under Section 125(1)(b) and only one exception has been made by enacting Sub-section (c)which enables the child which has attained majority to claim maintenance. That is a case where the child by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury is unable to maintain itself."

12. In the case of Moideenkuttty v. Pathumma and Ors. 1984 (2) Crimes 355, Kerela High Court has also taken the similar view. The following observations made in para 5 and 6 of the judgement at page 356 of the report are worth mentioning:

5. The liability to maintain a child who has attained majority arise only (a) if that child is not a married daughter and (b) if it is unable to maintain itself on account of (i) physical or mental abnormality or (ii) injury.

6. The Act, therefore, makes it clear that any child who has attained majority is not automatically entitled to claim maintenance even if he is unable to maintain himself as was the case under the old Code. The inability to maintain himself should arise out of physical or mental abnormality or injury. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

13. Keeping in view the law laid down in above mentioned cases, the impugned judgement granting maintenance allowance to Km. Bhavya and Km. Divya even after their attaining majority cannot be sustained, because as stated earlier also, both these daughters had attained majority much prior to the date of passing the impugned order and since their inability to maintain themselves cannot be attributed to any physical or mental abnormality or injury within the meaning of Section 125(1) (c) Cr.P.C., hence, they had become dis-entitled to get maintenance allowance from their father after attaining majority under the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. If they want to claim maintenance allowance from their father even after attaining majority, then they can approach Civil Court for this purpose.

14. So far as the claim of Smt. Neelam Srivastava to get maintenance allowance from her husband is concerned, I do not find any illegality in the finding recorded by the court below on this issue in the impugned order. The Family Court Varanasi has recorded a finding of fact that Smt. Neelam Srivastava is unable to maintain herself and her husband Amod Kumar Srivastava has neglected to maintain her. This finding of fact can not be disturbed by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction, because the said finding does not suffer from any error of fact or law and this finding has been arrived at by the learned court below after proper appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties, re-appreciation whereof is not possible by this Court in revisional jurisdiction.

15. Now the important question that arises for consideration is as to whether on the basis of the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights passed on 17.04.1986 by the Civil Judge Jaunpur in suit No. 54 of 1986 against Smt. Neelam Srivastava, she is not entitled to get maintenance allowance from her husband. Un-disputedly the said decree of the restitution of conjugal rights was passed ex-parte against Smt. Neelam Srivastava. It is also not disputed that the aforesaid decree was never put into execution by Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava. There is nothing on record to show that after obtaining aforesaid ex-parte decree, intimation thereof was given to Smt. Neelam Srivastava by her husband or any other person on his behalf for making its compliance. It was open to Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava to put that decree in execution under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short 'the C.P.C.'), but the said decree was not got executed by him as provided in Order 21 Rule 32 C.P.C. Therefore, in my considered opinion, Smt. Neelam Srivastava has not become dis-entitled to get maintenance allowance from her husband due to non-compliance of aforesaid ex-parte decree for the restitution of conjugal rights. From the record it is revealed that the revisionist Amod Kumar Srivastava had filed suit No. 145 of 1986 for divorce against her wife under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act in the Family Court Varanasi. Annexure 2 is the certified copy of the petition for divorce. During the course of that divorce petition, the parties had settled their dispute and on that basis, the divorce petition was dismissed vide order dated 08.01.1998, in which an order was passed by the Family Court that it is expected that the parties will start to live together as husband and wife after seven days. It has come in the statement of Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava that after that order, he did not go to his sasural to bring her wife to his house. It shows that Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava was not interested to live with his wife Smt. Neelam Srivastava and it was for this reason that he did not show any desire to bring her to his house to live with him after aforesaid order of Family Court. Therefore, having regard to the reasons mentioned herein-above, ex-parte decree obtained by Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava for the restitution of conjugal rights from the court of Civil Judge Jaunpur in suit No. 54 of 1986 has no effect in this case on the rights of Smt. Neelam Srivastava to get maintenance allowance from her husband Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava. http://evinayak.tumblr.com/ ; http://vinayak.wordpress.com/

16. Although, as stated herein-above, Smt. Neelam Srivastava is entitled to get maintenance allowance from her husband notwithstanding that ex-parte decree for the restitution of conjugal right is in existence against her, but in view the law laid down in the cases of Harish Mansukhlal v. Hansagauri Ramshanker, In the matter of : Rabindra Nath Roy and Balram Dash v. Smt. Gitanjali Dash (supra), on principle, I agree with the contention of Sri Sameer Jain Advocate that if a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights is passed against the wife and having knowledge thereof she wilfully disobeys the directions given by the court in the decree, then she is not entitled to get any maintenance allowance from her husband. This matter was considered by the Bombay High Court in the year 1920 in the case of Bai Parbati v. Chanchi Mansukh Jetha AIR 1920 Bom 203. In that case there was a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in favour of the husband. The wife did not comply with the said decree. The Hon'ble Macleod, C.J. who decided the matter, observed that:

In my opinion a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights is a relic from the barbarous and middle ages. It is recognised, and has been recognised for many years in England, that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is merely a preliminary step to enable a wife to get a divorce when she would not otherwise be able to do so, since the refusal of the husband to obey a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is considered as desertion, and desertion equivalent to cruelty, and therefore, such desertion, coupled with adultery, will be sufficient to enable a wife to get a decree for divorce. That is the only use to which proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights are now put in England. In this country they may be used by the husband as a means for preventing the wife from claiming maintenance, since, if the Court passes an order against a wife to go and live with her husband, and she refuses to do so, then she is debarred herself from making any claim to maintenance. For a wife is only entitled to separate maintenance if she has some good reasons for living apart from her husband.

17. The Calcutta High Court also considered this matter in the matter of Rabindra Nath Roy 1995 Cri.L.J. 1187 in which following observations have been made in para 3 of the judgement

Normally the finding of a competent Civil Court on a relevant issue is binding upon the Magistrate and,therefore, there cannot be any manner of doubt that at least during the subsistence of marriage, a husband can successfully resist the claim of his wife for maintenance on the ground that he has obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights on the ground of desertion. On the basis of such a decree the learned Magistrate is bound to hold that the wife without any sufficient reason has refused to live with her husband and the application claiming maintenance is liable to be lost. Looking to the provisions of the Section 125(4) Code of Criminal Procedure.

18. Similarily in the case of Balram Das v. Smt. Gitanjali Dash and Ors. 2000 Cri. L.J.4175 (supra), the Orisa High Court has observed that:

When a decree for restitution of conjugal right has been passed against the wife it can be held prima facie that refusal of the wife to comply with the direction regarding restitution amounts to refusal to live with the husband without sufficient reason.

It is further held as under:

In view of the fact that the decree for restitution of conjugal right has not been complied with by the wife, prima facie, it must be taken that the wife has refused to live with her husband without sufficient reason and is disentitled to claim maintenance. In such view of the matter, the order of interim maintenance in favour of the wife cannot be sustained.

19. This Court also considered the effect of the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights to claim maintenance under the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. in the case of Smt. Mahtaqb Begum v. Ansar Ahmad 1986 ALL.L.J.1096. The following observations made in para 9 of the judgment at page 1100 are worth mentioning:

Where the claim for the restitution succeeds and that too finally upon the finding that the wife has had no reasonable ground to live away from the spouse, it would be incongruous if the courts were to grant maintenance to the former in the same breath. The remedy by way of restitution of conjugal rights is based on the theory that husband and wife are entitled to the society of each other, it follows from the very nature of the matrimonial relation that they must be so entitled.

20. Now I come to Crl. Revision No. 5598 of 2006, which has been preferred by Smt. Neelam Srivastava against her husband to enhance and grant maintenance allowance from the date of the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. From the evidence adduced in Family Court Varanasi in the proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C., this fact is borne out that gross salary of Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava is more than Rs. 20,000/- per month and he is getting Rs. 12,000/- per month as net salary after deductions in G.P. Fund etc. The salary of Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava will be increasing from time to time. He is living alone and has no liability to maintain any other person. The prices of all the essential commodities are increasing day by day. Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava is a grade-I officer in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. He is income tax payee. Therefore, having regard to the social status of the parties and monthly income of Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava, his wife Smt. Neelam Srivastava also is entitled to live with dignity and comfort according to the status of her husband. Rs. 2000/- per month was granted as maintenance to both the daughters vide impugned judgment and that amount also was being paid to their mother Smt. Neelam Srivastava with their consent. In view of the findings recorded herein-above, this amount will not be paid now to the daughters. Therefore, keeping all these facts in view, the maintenance allowance granted to Smt. Neelam Srivastava vide impugned judgment should be enhanced and it would be just and proper, if Rs. 4000/- per month are granted to her as maintenance allowance. For the reasons assigned in the impugned judgment by the court below for granting maintenance allowance from the date of order, no interference is warranted by this Court in the finding on this matter, as the said finding is neither illegal nor unjustified.

21. Consequently, both the Revisions are partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 24.06.2006 is modified to the extent that Smt. Neelam Srivastava will get Rs. 4000/- per month as maintenance allowance from her husband Amod Kumar Srivastava from the date of impugned judgement, but Km. Bhavya and Km. Divya (opposite parties No. 3 and 4 in Crl. Revision No. 4400 of 2006) are not entitled to get any maintenance allowance under the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. from the date of their attaining majority.

Three months time is granted to Sri Amod Kumar Srivastava to make payment of the entire arrear of maintenance allowance, as modified by this judgment, after making adjustment of the maintenance allowance paid to Smt. Neelam Srivastava on behalf of both the daughters after attaining their majority. In further the payment of maintenance allowance will be made by 10th day of each month through the court or by Bank Draft in the name of Smt. Neelam Srivastava.

The Office is directed to send copy of this judgement to the Family Court Varanasi for further necessary action.



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Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn't given up, Male, activist
  
  

Friday, January 24, 2014

Rahul said "... 50% of India is women so we need to EMPOWER WOMEN to be a superpower ..", SOON BJP WILL BE SIGNING the same tune WOMEN ... GIRLS..WOMEN ......and NO ONE will talk of the OTHER 50% , i.e. the MEN !!!!

Rahul said "... 50% of India is women so we need to EMPOWER WOMEN to be a superpower ..", SOON BJP WILL BE SIGNING the same tune WOMEN ... GIRLS..WOMEN ......and NO ONE will talk of the OTHER 50% , i.e. the MEN !!!!


India can't be superpower without empowering women, youth: Rahul Gandhi

By PTI | 24 Jan, 2014, 06.02PM IST


SEVAGRAM (MAHARASHTA): Seeking to reinvigorate the Congress ahead of a difficult general election, party's chief campaigner Rahul Gandhi today pitched for empowering women, local bodies representatives and youth, saying India cannot become a superpower without that.

Gandhi, who has launched an initiative to elicit the views of a cross section of people for inputs to draft Congress manifesto, was interacting with party's local body representatives, pradhans, NGOs and bureaucrats at th ..

Read more at: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29309379.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst



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Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn't given up, Male, activist
  
  

Tuesday, January 14, 2014

whaaat ? conviction rate has dropped ? NO !! the FALSE CASE RATE HAS DOUBLED , and that's why conviction is half !! & In 2012, 84.6% of a total of 9 million cases had not gone to trial, while charge-sheeting rate has remained constant at around 80% from 2002 to 2012.

whaaat ? conviction rate has dropped ? NO !! the FALSE CASE RATE HAS DOUBLED , and that's why conviction is half !! & In 2012, 84.6% of a total of 9 million cases had not gone to trial, while charge-sheeting rate has remained constant at around 80% from 2002 to 2012.


Conviction rate dips to almost half in 40 years

Deeptiman Tiwary,TNN | Jan 14, 2014, 04.16 AM IST

NEW DELHI: Given the abysmally poor conviction rate in serious cases of crime, the recent Supreme Court order to formulate a procedure for taking action against erring investigating or prosecuting officials for acquittals could spell trouble for almost the entire system.

According to National Crime Records Bureau data, in the past four decades, the rate of conviction in crimes committed under Indian Penal Code (IPC) has dropped miserably. From 62.7% in 1972, conviction rate in IPC crimes has dropped to 38.5% in 2012.

Data shows the courts too have become increasingly sluggish in the past 40 years with the ratio of cases tried to those committed for trial dropping from 30.9% to 13.4%, resulting in massive pendency. In 2012, 84.6% of a total of 93,28,085 cases had not gone to trial.

To make matters worse, in serious crimes such as murder, rape and robbery conviction rates are far lower than the national average for all IPC crimes (38.5%). While for murder conviction rate stands at 35.6%, for rape it is 24.2% even as only 28.6% of robbery cases end in conviction.

And if SC orders are followed and implemented, investigating and prosecuting officers of states such as Maharashtra, West Bengal and Odisha are in trouble. Conviction rates in all these states hovers merely at around 10%. In violent crimes such as murder and rape, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, West Bengal, Odisha, Jammu and Kashmir and Maharashtra have the worst record (if only big states with significant population are taken into account). In all these states, conviction rate for murder hovers in the range of 19-27%, while for rape it is between 7.5% and 21.3%.

Police sources say the problem is far greater than the inadequacies of investigating and prosecuting officers, and correcting it would take an overhauling of the entire criminal justice system. "If there is corruption in police, lower judiciary is no exception. Also, we need far greater number of policemen and courts to address this problem. No one is ready to address the issue of police reforms which talks about separating investigation wings from law and order units apart from other significant changes which could have an impact on conviction rates," said a senior police officer on condition of anonymity.

The NCRB data only emphasizes the urgency of addressing the issue of police reforms given that at the end of 2012, there were still 8,45,495 cases pending investigation by the police despite a disposal rate of 73.8% while dealing with 32,43,783 cases accumulated over the years. In fact, in the past decade, little has changed in terms of police charge-sheets. The charge-sheeting rate has remained constant at around 80% from 2002 to 2012.



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Monday, January 6, 2014

Forwarded !! My wife wants sex all the time! She refuses to do any work , either inside or outside home , I am also managing the servants and the family breadwinner !! Pleas Help !!! Please help


Forwarded ! My wife wants sex all the time! She refuses to do any work , either inside or outside home , I am also managing the servants and the family breadwinner !! Pleas Help !!! Please help 
Dec 26, 2013, 12.00AM IST 
Times of india 
My wife wants sex all the time! Help (Getty Images)
Question: I am a 42-year-old man, well educated and city bred. I have been married for two years. My wife is 21-years-old from a small town and not well educated. As this was an arranged marriage between old family friends, I didn't mind. My wife wants sex all the time, and at least 3-4 times daily, apart from the night. At times I have woken up from sleep to find her on top of me. She is not interested in working, either outside or inside the house. I have been managing the servants too. All day she is busy chatting with the neighbours and once when I overheard her, it was again all about sex. Is this normal behaviour? It is definitely not what I had expected. So much of over-indulgence only in sex may be okay now, but what will happen 5-10 years down the line if she has no other interests? 
- ABC 

Answer: I don't think anyone has ever been able to quantify what a 'normal' sex drive is or what should be considered the normal frequency of lovemaking. So, probably anything goes, as long as it does not interfere with the rest of your life. In your particular case, the huge age gap is responsible to a large extent for the difference in perceptions regarding sex. And if you are managing to keep up the pace with your young wife, why then, you must surely be congratulated. 

Even though there is a part of you that is rationalising the entire thing. Obviously, the flesh is willing even though the spirit is not! Meanwhile, instead of condemning this attitude and behaviour of hers, it would be better to let her discover all the joys and pleasures of physical gratification. And like all other good things in life, this too just might be unable to sustain itself. Thereby putting to rest your fears and apprehensions regarding the future. As for finding her on top of you, I am sure that is a welcome deviation from the routine and often-drab missionary variety! No?


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Sunday, January 5, 2014

Will This guy be castrated for 30 years ? Or ? Lover boy kills innocent young girl as she refused to marry him



Will This guy be castrated for 30 years ? Or ? Lover boy kills innocent young girl as she refused to marry him. They have been having relations for long but the innocent girl is no Longer alive to file case against him :-( :-( 


Short notes in English followed by full story in Tamil 


Sashikala (24 ) , daughter of Patturaja , resident if unjavelampatti  , near pollachi , Coimbatore district , was missing from home 

Her father preferred a police complaint 

During police complaint it come to light that she was in love with a co Worker a certain Mr Vinofh ( 28 ) who was also missing around the same time 

Police started searching for Vinodh 

Vinod was located and caught at Coimbatore , with the aid if his mobile phone signals 

On interrogation , Vinodh confessed that he and sashikala had relations for some time and when he repeatedly sought her hand she refused to marry him 

Angered by that tefusal he killed her 

Vinodh later identified the place he had buried sashikala's body and police have recovered a half decomposed corpse 

***** full Tamil news below *******

பதிவு செய்த நாள்


பொள்ளாச்சி: பொள்ளாச்சி அருகே, காணாமல் போனதாக தேடப்பட்டு வந்த இளம்பெண், காதலனால் கொலை செய்யப்பட்டு, புதைக்கப்பட்டது, போலீஸ் விசாரணையில் தெரியவந்தது. இரண்டு மாதங்களுக்கு பிறகு உடல் கைப்பற்றப்பட்டது.


கோவை மாவட்டம், பொள்ளாச்சி ஊஞ்சவேலாம்பட்டியை சேர்ந்த பட்டுராஜா மகள் சசிகலா, 24. கோதவாடியிலுள்ள, தனியார் நிறுவனத்தில் வேலை பார்த்து வந்தார். கடந்த அக்., 24 ம் தேதி வேலைக்கு சென்றவர், வீடு திரும்பவில்லை. இது குறித்து, பட்டுராஜா பொள்ளாச்சி மகளிர் போலீசில் புகார் அளித்தார். முதற்கட்ட விசாரணையில், உடன் வேலை பார்த்த ஒத்தக்கால் மண்டபத்தை சேர்ந்த வினோத்,26, என்பவரை சசிகலா காதலித்து வந்ததும், இவர் காணாமல் போன நாள் முதல் காதலனும், தலைமறைவானதும் தெரிய வந்தது. சந்தேகமடைந்த போலீசார், தலைமறைவான வினோத்தை தேடி வந்தனர். இந்நிலையில், சில நாட்களுக்கு முன், கோவையில் சுற்றித்திரிந்த வினோத், போலீசாரால் கைது செய்யப்பட்டார். அவரிடம் நடத்திய விசாரணையில், அவர் சசிகலாவை கொலை செய்து, ஈச்சனாரி பை-பாஸ் ரோடு பகுதியில் புதைத்தது, தெரியவந்தது.


இது குறித்து போலீசார் கூறியதாவது:



ஒரே இடத்தில் பணிபுரிந்த, வினோத், சசிகலா இருவரும் சில ஆண்டுகளாக காதலித்து இருக்கின்றனர். இடையில் வினோத், வேறு வேலைக்கு சென்றுவிட்டார். ஒரு கட்டத்தில், சசிகலாவிடம் வினோத் திருமணத்திற்கு வற்புறுத்தியுள்ளார். அவர் அதற்கு மறுப்பு தெரிவித்து வந்துள்ளார். கடந்த அக்., 24ம் தேதி, அவரை காரில் அழைத்துச்சென்ற வினோத், திரும்ப திருமணம் பற்றி பேசியுள்ளார். சசிகலா சம்மதிக்காததால், ஆத்திரமடைந்த வினோத் தாக்கியதில், அவர் மயங்கி விழுந்துள்ளார். பின், அவரது கழுத்தை நெரித்து கொன்று விட்டு, உடலை, ஈச்சனாரி பை-பாஸ் ரோட்டில், முட்புதர்களுக்கு இடையே உள்ள குழியில் தள்ளி புதைத்து விட்டார். பின் தலைமறைவாகி, பல்வேறு இடங்களில் சுற்றித்திரிந்த வினோத், கோவை வந்த போது, மொபைல் போன் சிக்னல் உதவியால் பிடிபட்டார். வினோத் அடையாளம் காட்டிய இடத்திலிருந்து, அழுகிய நிலையில், சசிகலாவின் உடல் கைப்பற்றப்பட்டது. இவ்வாறு போலீசார் தெரிவித்தனர்.




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Father of a lovely daughter, criminal in the eyes of a wife, son of an compassionate elderly mother, old timer who hasn't given up, Male, activist